Simon mentions reports of an award for soldiers who don’t use lethal force in Afghanistan. The source article doesn’t link to or mention a source for the story but there was some brief discussion about the idea of a medal for ‘courageous restraint’ at the symposium. So, allow me talk about the context in which the subject came up.
As described, there was a protest outside of a military based after rumors that U.S. soldiers had burned a Koran as part of a anti-coalition whisper campaign. The crowd got intense and began throwing rocks, one of which hit a U.S. soldier and injured him. The soldier was authorized to fire according to the standing rules of engagement but did not. His restraint was identified as key to allowing coalition forces to calm the crowd down and win the locals back over.
The idea of the medal seemed to be part of an exchange of ideas over how to reward soldiers who demonstrated an understanding of the principles and intent of COIN by going ‘above and beyond’ the call of duty to implement them. My impression was that the medal idea (and not a separate medal but rather use of an existing one like an Army Achievement or Commendation medal) hadn’t really gained traction (and my understanding afterwards is that it was rejected as ‘too gimicky’) and was only one of a number of possible ways to acknowledge soldiers (other options might include a pass, letter in their personnel file, etc.).
I suspect that the motivation behind this whole drive is two fold:
- A concern that COIN hasn’t gotten down to the lowest levels of the various militaries
- Right now, we only reward soldiers for kinetic activity. It’s generally accepted that people will do whatever they’re evaluated and rewarded for. Therefore, if COIN is about winning the confidence of the people, partnering with local security forces and spreading security we might need to think about ways to evaluate and reward behaviors that support those activities.
It’s not a perfect or exclusive solution but if used in a more comprehensive plan to universalize COIN doctrine it could play a role.
All in all, this seems like it was a suggestion put forth for debate and discussion, got caught up in the blogosphere and blown out of proportion.
There’s also some unsubstantiated reports that soldiers are being ordered to go out on patrol without having rounds chambered in their weapons. Yet again, these reports are unsourced (apart from commenters on Michael Yon’s facebook page. Really? That’s a source? Hey, here’s a tip…this internet thingy…people aren’t required to tell the truth on it or even know what they’re talking about when they write on it. Yeah…hey, there’s a Mr. Pot on the phone looking for a Mr. Kettle. That wouldn’t be you, would it?. eds.)
So, I’d take all of this with a grain of salt. Just like the talk about soldiers having to Mirandize people they capture on the battlefield.
I’d say that your example does indicate that the ‘COIN’ message is getting down to the lowest levels. If anything, it is having trouble penetrating a few skulls far higher up the food chain.
We do already, and have done for decades, recognise non-kinetic achievements above and beyond the call of normal duty up to and including the level of the VC and MOH. That there is even discussion of need for a specific award for restraint is indicative of a perception that there is a need for such incentives; that such incentives will mean diddly-squat to soldiers at the sharp end; and that training and ethical development for the COE is not adequate.
I must admit that I was a bit lazy in linking my sources this morning but there had been discussion of both the restraint medal and an ‘unloaded weapon’ policy around the time of the opening of the Marjah offensive – I suppose we can’t be offensive anymore so that should more correctly be the Marjah nicety – but I also discounted them at the time as a bit of a joke…but if you start to hear the same joke again and again…
One rather narrow perception of COIN (based largely on myths of the Commonwealth campaigns in Malaya and Kenya) focus solely on the people. In reality the people who count the most in the ‘COIN’ environment are the people at home, whose waning support is more critical to maintaining the Afghan Campaign that those of the mythical ‘people’ of Afghanistan – which is comprised of ‘peoples’ aka tribes.
As I said this morning, the role of the military is the application of force, in the case of the Afghan Campaign, to develop a secure environment for reconstruction efforts to bolster a government that will collapse as soon as the last ISAF aircraft goes wheels up. This breaches another more important fundamental of COIN, two of them in fact. The first is the need for realistic (realpolitik) and practical campaign objectives e.g. destroy AQ training camps and cadres and discourage their return. The second is the you can’t set a timetable for COIN i.e. no statements like ‘withdrawal by mid-2011′.
If anything, it is starting to sound like FM 3-24 and JP 3024 have been put on the back burner in favour of the Canadian equivalent which favours minimal use of force (force is just a tool) and the application/infliction of domestic values and mores on the host nation people (and we wonder why they kick back!)…
Well, I probably haven’t brought this out yet when discussing my synopsis of the conference but the speakers (especially for the people who commanded forces in Afghanistan) all were adamant that when necessary there should be no hesitation to bring intense, lethal force. At no point did I get the impression that forces should be restrained when faced with the enemy.
They all said that combat ops had an important role in a COIN campaign and my comments thus far may have given a different impression. If so, the fault is with me.
I agree that the soldier’s action did, as you say, demonstrate an understanding of COIN principles of that soldier (and perhaps his unit). My understanding (and I’m out on a limb here by making assumptions on assumptions so I could be way off base) however is that there’s a concern that level of understanding isn’t spread universally across all units and throughout the coalition.
Leave it to you to scoop me as well. Your point about one of the centers of gravity of COIN is the domestic population of the country supplying troops was made by one of the speakers and should be out in a future post.
It’s a nice thought but I think it’s only a scoop if it came from a similar source…I think it’s more a sign that people are starting to think outside the mythical COIN paradigm and consider what is actually happening…a really good read is Dr Jeffrey Grey’s analysis of post-WW2 COIN from an Aussie POV in the AS Army Journal COIN edition from 2008 (http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/docs/aaj_winter_2008_2_2.pdf) that debunks the myths of Malaya and Kenya…
Perhaps we should have been seeking out thinker like Dr Grey in 2005 instead of succumbing to the Brit assertions that they had the answers…
Back to courageous restraint, if the ‘COIN’ message isn’t getting through at all levels, then we need to have a serious looking at peacetime and force generation training. Then Marines seem to have the balance right – although that could be because they most definitely have their information machined wired right which is a major win in its own right – and my perception is that the osmosis of COINism may be more dififcult in reroled units and those being drawn from reserve formations (in that the adjustment to this environment from a Reserve paradigm MAY need to be longer and/or more intense…?