The week of the serial killers

5 12 2007

I’m not particularly interested in crime movies or shows but this week, for some inexplicable reason, most of my TV/movie viewing has centered around the theme of serial killers.

It all began on Sunday with the latest episode of Dexter.  When a friend told me about this show I was initially skeptical.  Yet another crime show where…let me guess…a different scumbag criminal gets caught every week and the world is clearly divided between ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’.  Boy, was I wrong.

The show focuses on Dexter who is a blood spatter analyst working for the Miami PD.  The twist is that he is also a serial killer.  The show balances the tensions between making the character likable while at the same time, reminding you that ‘Hey, this guy kills people and cuts them up into tiny pieces.’  It’s a credit to the writers that they are able to pull it off so well.

Next up was the movie Zodiac which is about the killer of the same name who was active in California during the late ’60s and early ’70s.  It might be more appropriate to say that the movie is about Robert Graysmith’s research and writing of a book about the killer.   As such, this is one time where reading the book before seeing the movie will actually make the film better (the two works are complementary rather than covering the exact same events).  I really enjoyed the book and the movie was quite good as well.

Finally, I saw Mr. Brooks with Kevin Costner.  While not a perfect movie (the female roles were particularly weak) the film contained enough interesting ideas and a good performance by William Hurt that it was worthwhile to see.  It was one of those movies that had the potential to be a great movie with a bit more work.





Sandviken…the Swedish town that had no balls

2 12 2007

I know Swedes generally like to have a non-confrontational attitude throughout their life but this is firmly in crazy land territory.

Apparently, some members of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club rented a hanger in the town of Sandviken.  The town, apparently became concerned about this (and for good reason, the Outlaws conduct a wide variety of violent, narcotic, and commodity crimes).  So, rather than utilize law enforcement and local laws to send a clear message that illegal activity by them would not be tolerated (even relatively ’small’ steps like noise ordinances and strict enforcement of traffic laws can make outlaw bikers avoid areas in order to escape being ‘hassled’ by the police) the city ended up paying off the bikers (to the tune of about $31,000) to move to another location.

You don’t have to be a expert in criminal activity to realize that the local governing body of Sandviken just screwed themselves and other small towns in the region.  They basically just put out a sign advertising for every semi-organized criminal organization to move into their town and try to extort money from the population.  Holy crips!  You’ve got to wonder what the people living in that town are thinking.

Maybe it’s an attempt to boost tourism:

“Come to beautiful Sandviken and bully us!  Don’t worry we won’t put up a fight and we’ll pay you for your trouble!”

Or possibly an ad campaign for a local vodka:

Absolut Disgrace

 Ah…Sandviken…where (apparently) the women are women and so are the men.





What to do with all that Afghanistan Opium

27 11 2007

One of the constant obstacles to making significant progress in Afghanistan is figuring out how to handle the opium trade. The knee jerk reaction is to defoliate, burn and arrest our way to a solution but given the abysmal track record of that strategy thus far in the War on Drugs there’s no reason to think that we’ll have better luck with those tactics in Afghanistan.

In fact, there are a number of complicating factors that not only make the prospect of getting farmers to stop growing poppies really, really unlikely but our ‘go to’ tactics will most likely make the security situation in Afghanistan worse and undermine what little authority the Karzai government has.

LTC John Glaze recently wrote a monograph for the Strategic Studies Institute titled “Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy” which highlights these challenges and makes some recommendations. He cites the following facts:

  • opium production in 2006 was 6,100 metric tons, up from 4,100 metric tons in 2005
  • an Afghan farmer can make 17 times more profit growing opium poppy than wheat
  • Poppy is also drought resistant, easy to transport and store, and, unlike many crops, requires no refrigeration and does not spoil
  • less than 4 percent of arable land in Afghanistan was used for opium poppy cultivation in 2006, revenue from the harvest brought in over $3 billion—more than 35 percent of the country’s total GNP.
  • Almost 10% of Afghanistan’s population is involved in poppy cultivation or processing
  • In many cases, farmers are simply unable to support their families growing traditional crops; and because most rural farmers are uneducated and illiterate, they have few economically viable alternatives to growing opium poppy

Once, while conducting security interviews for Afghans looking to work on our base, a man told me:

“Without this job I can either buy food so my family can eat or firewood to keep them warm but not both.”

When faced with choices like that, how many of us would refuse to do something illegal like growing poppies? Perhaps more importantly, if driven to this level of desperation, what would we think about people (who don’t have to face the same level of deprevation) who swoop in, destroy our prospect of providing food and shelter for our families and just as quickly disappear, leaving nothing more than a destroyed crop?

Glaze says (and I agree with him) that it’s no coincidence that the Taliban is proving to be more difficult to defeat and, in fact, seems to be gaining support in areas throughout the country at the same time traditional anti-narcotics methods are being used. Essentially, we’re pushing the farmers of poppies into the arms of the Taliban. If no insurgency can exist without the sympathy of the local population, our drug policy looks a lot like a Taliban subsidization plan.

So why would we follow a policy which is clearly counterproductive?

  1. Our entire national policy for the past 30 years regarding drugs has been one which views drug production and use and an overwhelmingly criminal problem. The underlying narrative is that coercion is the best (and likely only) way to impact the narcotics trade (the Vlahos article I wrote about yesterday has utility here - our ‘rule sets’ preclude anything else other than what we’re currently doing)
  2. Perhaps even more telling was a quote Glaze found by an Assistant Secretary of State for Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: “[T]he simple truth is that eradication is much easier…” than other methods of reducing narcotics production/distribution.

We (the law enforcement community, politicians, the public) have so bought into the idea that progress in narcotics can be defined by arrests, drugs seized, acres of crop defoliated that we have no other metrics to gauge our success or failure. My opinion is that those criteria are about as effective as body counts were during Vietnam.

Glaze makes a number of recommendations which sound reasonable yet I’m not sure how politically feasible they are (remove the ROE restrictions on European troops? More humanitarian funding?).

Another idea I’ve seen kicked around once or twice is the interesting (yet politically suicidal) plan of getting the Western nations to come together and buy up the entire opium crop from Afghan farmers. By cornering the opium market (Afghanistan produces something like 90% of all the world’s opium) you have the potential to do a few things:

  1. Cut off funding for the Taliban (which gets about 70% of its revenue from poppy cultivation/production/trafficking)
  2. Drive a wedge between farmers and the Taliban
  3. Reduce supply on the illicit narcotics market around the world.  This would have several follow on benefits like raising costs (and therefore making heroin/opium use more costly and treatment more attractive) and fostering competition between narcotics networks

Of course, such a plan couldn’t work over the long term but when combined with opportunities for farmers to grow other crops (plus the infrastructure and transportation resources to get their crops to market and many of the other things Glaze recommends) you could get some real results.





The 2007 NJ Gang Survey - Part Deux

26 10 2007

The media’s take on the 2007 NJSP Gang Survey is starting to be revealed today. I think the decision not to include total gang population estimates was a good one since it looks like it’s forcing people to read the report rather than latching onto a number like a Titanic survivor clinging to a life preserver and ignoring everything else. As a result, the stories seem more informative and well rounded than I remember in the wake of the 2004 Survey.

Here’s a roundup of some of the stories out there:

Asbury Park Press - Pretty good focus on Monmouth and Ocean counties.

Gloucester County Times - Focuses (as you might expect) on Gloucester County. Good discussion about gang migration and gangs in suburbs.

The Star Ledger - Good general overview with discussion about links to the Governor’s newly released crime plan.

The Times of Trenton - This is a pretty good article with the exception of the description of MS-13 as ‘movers and shakers’. MS-13 hysteria has more to do with a few grisly acts that get a lot of media play as well as linking to the anti-immigrant feeling sweeping the country than the true nature of the threat.

Some of the interesting themes in most of the stories:

G.R.E.A.T. got mentioned a couple of times as a tactic to help keep kids out of gangs. Unfortunately, like D.A.R.E., the program doesn’t actually seem to do much other than make people feel like they’re doing something. The two programs cost a great deal of money and there’s very little evidence that they’re effective.

A few of the article pick up on the fact that the report is actual a survey of law enforcement’s perception of the gang environment in their jurisdiction rather than an attempt at any sort of objective description of gangs. Those two could be very different depending on a host of factors like agency experience in identifying gangs, public/political pressure, agency priorities, etc.

Many people have been beating the drums about the fact that gangs can’t be considered solely an inner city issue. The problem is that most people have deeply ingrained images of both gang members and a gang neighborhood and it’s hard to get your head around the fact that someone could be in a gang and not fit that stereotype. There’s been some good academic literature comparing crime (specifically juvenile crime) in depressed, inner cities and in the suburbs. The criminal justice system is much more likely to identify urban, minority criminal suspects as gang members while white, suburban individuals charged with the same (or similar) crimes are often regarded as delinquents or even ‘boys raisin’ hell’. As a result, every time some report comes out talking about gangs in the suburbs there’s both alarm (Oh, my god! Get my gun!) and disbelief (I haven’t seen any people dressed in red hanging out on the street corner selling dope, that report must be a lie!). We should expect gang members in a middle class suburb to act in the exact same ways that gang members in a inner city housing project would.





The Animal Liberation Front

1 10 2007

 

Here’s a rather lengthy post consisting of a report I did for one of my graduate classes about the Animal Liberation Front. I’m posting it because another blog entry I did on the animal rights movement received a number of views and I thought there might be some interest in this subject.

If anyone has any comments, critiques or additional information on the subject, I’d love to hear it!

Enjoy

Oh yeah…and don’t even think about plagiarizing this! It’s bad karma, mojo and juju.

The Animal Liberation Front

In May of 2004, John E. Lewis, the Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counter Terrorism Division announced that animal and environmental extremist groups were the “highest domestic terrorism investigative priority” for the bureau.[1] Coming less than three years after 9/11 and amid worries of ‘home grown’ Islamic terrorism in the wake of the Madrid bombing, the statement came as a surprise to many. Members of these environmental groups, as well as their sympathizers, argued that the assessment of their groups was derived more from corruption, caving in to industry pressure and an attempt to restrict civil liberties than from any true threat. In the nearly three years since then, the debate between the two groups has only intensified with environmental rights groups claiming to be concerned citizens following the traditions of 19th century abolitionists and civil rights advocates and law enforcement and industry groups predicting an inevitable wave of violence and destruction by these increasingly radical groups. The truth, for better or for worse, is that these groups are both more complicated and more interesting than either simplistic caricature would indicate.

Unlike Al-Qaeda, Hamas and other terrorist organizations that have received attention from the intelligence community over the past few years, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and other environmental rights groups have rarely been the subject of any serious attempt at analysis. Most assessments are little more than regurgitation of ‘conventional wisdom’ (often incorrect), misreading of ALF literature and actions or unfounded speculation. While the ALF does present some challenges to analysts and researchers trying to understand the movement (which may be a better characterization than identifying it as a group or organization) it also offers a number of opportunities to those wishing to grasp its capabilities and intent:

1. The modern animal rights (hereafter referred to as AR) movement has a lengthy history, stretching back over thirty years. In that time its advocates, who tend to be well educated, have created an impressive body of literature discussing both the ideological and practical aspects of their movement.

2. Their unorganized structure and geographic separation requires that communications on such subjects must generally occur publicly. This allows us not only to study what members are saying but also gauge the reaction to it by the rest of the movement.

3. Finally, the importance of the fact that the radical AR movement is dominated by individuals who were raised and educated in Western traditions and are citizens of the nation in which they operate should not be understated. The analyst studying the AR movement does not have to navigate through the difficulties of language translation or cultural context to nearly the same extent that their contemporaries studying groups that have their roots in different cultures or parts of the world have to.

This paper is will serve an initial step to address this shortfall by examining the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), identified by the FBI as being one of the most dangerous domestic terrorist groups in the United States. The paper is designed to be a threat assessment, examining both the capabilities and the intent of the organization. The format of this assessment will divide the paper into three sections: background which will cover the history and ideology of the ALF, operations which will discuss its tactics, organization and interactions with other organizations and outlook which will discuss predictions about possible future operations.

The ALF is an unusual organization in that it does not neatly fit into the preconceived notion of a terrorist organization. Most discussions of the ALF’s categorization (and, indeed, the categorization of most radical environmental groups) as a terrorist group are based on arguments that presuppose the ALF’s guilt or innocence. The issue is complicated by the fact that no universally recognized definition of terrorism exists. Even within the U.S. government, each agency concerned with terrorism has a slightly varying definition which can cause confusion. The FBI has jurisdiction over terrorism within the United States and their definition[2] clearly places the ALF within the realm of terrorist organizations. Still, the term ‘terrorism’ is so loaded in light of current events that it may interfere with useful study of organizations like the ALF. Therefore, I have generally avoided the term here in favor of the terms ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ organization.

Finally, the ALF is not only active in the United States. It has its origins in the United Kingdom and remains active throughout Europe. ALF activists in the U.K. have a much clearer history of engaging in violent activity than their American counterparts. While many law enforcement and industry analysts in the United States like to link the activities of the two networks in order to amplify the threat posed by the ALF there is very little evidence of operational or logistical support between the two groups[3] and future study may find it valuable to actually consider the ALF to be two separate networks of individuals. This assessment, therefore, only purports to describe the ALF in the United States.

Background

History

In the United States, the ALF traces it origins back to two sources; the social and environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the rise of militant animal rights groups in the United Kingdom. With the enactment of civil rights legislation in the 1960s and the end of the Vietnam War in 1973, politically motivated individuals turned their attention to a new set of issues including a host of environmental causes. Coming on the heels of these successful social movements, Earth Day in 1970 sparked widespread attention regarding environmental and is now seen as an important catalyst to legislation like the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act and the Endangered Species Act. Environmentalists likely had high expectations of further success in the future and a sense of growing momentum within society for their cause.

As the 1970s progressed however, some activists became disillusioned with slow progress being made in the environmental arena. Jimmy Carter’s presidency was seen as the greatest opportunity to make positive change ‘within the system’, yet some activists eventually became convinced that the traditional system of compromise and consensus building was too slow and would never accept the radical changes required to repair the damage done to the environment.[4] Mainstream environmental groups were also seen as co-opted by the existing political system and not sufficiently radical to force through the required political change.

In the United Kingdom at the same time individuals interested in animal rights began to organize and consider taking direct action to further their agenda. Opposition to hunting had a long tradition within the U.K. and had served as a focal point for those interested in animal rights. In 1972, several members of the Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA), a group dedicated to disrupting hunting activity throughout the British countryside, split off and formed a new group. The Band of Mercy, named after the youth wing of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and created in 1875, began as another hunt saboteur organization. In addition to traditional methods which attempted to disrupt hunts while they were in progress, the Band of Mercy began experimenting with tactics designed to prevent the hunt from beginning such as disabling vehicles.

By 1973 the Band of Mercy had decided to expand the scope of their actions from sports hunting to animal testing facilities and commercial hunting operations. They began a campaign of property destruction through arson and targeted a number of pharmaceutical laboratories and seal hunters. The goal of the group was to make it prohibitively expensive for these businesses to get insurance coverage and thereby shut them down. In August of 1974, two leaders of the Band of Mercy were arrested and sentenced to prison and the organization disbanded. One of the Band of Mercy leaders, Ronnie Lee, began organizing a new animal rights group upon his release from prison and, in 1976, christened it the Animal Liberation Front.[5]

It is unclear how the ALF migrated to the United States but the almost universally accepted account is that sometime in the late 1970s an American activist known only as “Valerie” traveled to the U.K. and received training from Ronnie Lee. Upon return to the U.S., “Valerie” led a group of animal activists on a number of ‘liberations’ where laboratory animals were released. This story is almost certainly apocryphal given the sparseness of details and the accomplishments “Valerie” is credited with. She not only was busy operationally but she provided financial and logistical support to the new movement and traveled around the country establishing other ALF cells.[6] Stories about her seem to stop in the mid to late 1980s and she has since moved on to become part of the AR pantheon. It’s particularly interesting that actions attributed to “Valerie” are limited strictly to ‘liberation’ and there don’t seem to be any accounts of her advocating or engaging in property destruction or violence. One account[7] implies that “Valerie” was no longer part of the ALF when it began to include property destruction and arson among its tactics.

Ideology

According to the ALF, animals, as sentient creatures, are seen to have a number of basic rights including ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’.[8] Valuing human life above those of animals is seen as ‘speciesism’ which is no more legitimate than racism or sexism. They view the use of animals for experimentation or entertainment as no different than slavery and often describe the current situation as an ongoing ‘holocaust’. While education and legislative change are helpful, they don’t go far or fast enough to address the seriousness of the issue.

The ALF rejects the idea that they are a terrorist organization, rather they label their targets as ‘real’ terrorists and those that actively oppose them are either collaborators or perpetrators in a massive genocide. The destruction of animals and the environment and harassment of AR activists, they feel, as demonstrates that they are following the same tradition as those who ran the underground railroad of 19th century, fought against the holocaust, protested for women’s suffrage and civil rights. They argue that labeling the ALF ‘terrorists’ makes just as much sense as saying members of those movements were terrorists.

Radical AR advocates see the consequences of failure in their mission as the reinforcement of violence in human behavior, the death of billions of living creatures (each one as morally entitled to life as any human) and complete ecological catastrophe. The stakes are so high, in the view of the ALF, that it is too late for compromise or moderation and direct action is the only way to achieve success. The stated goals of the ALF are “to save as many animals as possible and directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse. Their long term aim is to end all animal suffering by forcing animal abuse companies out of business.”[9]

The ALF views of the U.S. government run across a narrow spectrum from suspicion to hostility. Events since 9/11 have fueled a widespread belief within the AR community that they are convenient targets to allow the government to impose tight control over society and crush dissent. The focus of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies on AR activities are seen as a new wave of McCarthyism with environmentalists taking on the role of communists. The Animal Enterprise Protection Act, Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act and Patriot Act are all cited as evidence that the government is attempting to restrict the rights of free speech and protest and make progressive social movements (which many see as being the most important part of) impotent.

Legislation identifying radical environmental groups as terrorists and laws enabling industry to continue to use animals are seen as illegitimate and therefore need not be adhered to. Increasingly, ALF members committing acts of destruction and vandalism have been specifically mentioning in their communiqués that they will continue to defy laws designed to stop their activities. In many cases they specifically state that their actions are in response to specific anti-terrorism legislation or to recently convicted extremists.[10]

Another argument the ALF makes to defend itself from the terrorist label is their assertion that no one has been killed, or targeted for death, by an ALF action. They have created a rather narrow definition of terrorism that doesn’t include either the destruction of physical property or the intentional instilling of fear and anxiety in the minds of others. Property is viewed as worth infinitely less than life and therefore destruction of objects to save life is always justified so long as it doesn’t harm others.[11] Additionally, since definitions of terrorism that the ALF like to use require harm to be intended against persons, they claim that no amount of destruction they commit can ever be interpreted as terrorism.

Regarding the instillation of fear or anxiety in a target population the ALF usually remains silent. The threat of action against a person or corporate entity is a key tactic that the ALF uses yet the fact that it may create the same sort of fear that AR activists protest so vigorously when applied to animals makes it’s justification difficult. The scarcity of philosophic justifications of its use most likely indicates that it is an area that ALF advocates would rather not venture into. When they occasionally do discuss fear and anxiety of their (potential) targets the ALF justifies its actions by relying upon a utilitarian argument that causing a bit of fear and anxiety will reduce the total amount of fear experienced by countless animals. Also, there is often a secondary argument that making their targets afraid is justified because their targets ‘deserve’ it.[12]

The involvement of the ALF in violent activity has been a matter of discussion, both within the movement and among those studying it, for quite some time. One of the ALF’s central tenets is: “To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human and non-human.”[13] Further, the ALF literature is filled with rejections of violent activity in general terms and distinguish themselves from groups that advocate violent activity such as the Animal Rights Milita, Revolutionary Cells and Justice Department which they describe as “ultra-radical” groups.[14] The ALF also takes the position that since they don’t engage in violent activity as a matter of policy, any act (even if carried out in the name of the ALF) which causes harm can’t, by definition, be attributed to them. The argument is that individuals conducting violent acts either don’t understand the central tenets of the ALF or are intentionally attempting to discredit the organization.

Countering their claims of non-violence, there have been a number of high profile ALF activists and sympathizers who have advocated the need to escalate their activities and engage in physical violence. Those who have recommended violent action include national level spokespeople or activists who have gained attention from the media. A psychological study of these individuals is beyond the scope of this paper but would be helpful in identifying differences (if any) between them and ‘average’ members. ALF members requires secrecy and anonymity in order to be successful and it’s not at all clear if members publicly proclaiming the need to consider using violent tactics are serving the needs of their movement or addressing personal needs of self fulfillment.

Ultimately, the arguments in favor of the ALF committing violent activity don’t seem to resonate with rank and file members. Despite justifications from well known affiliates of the ALF, it does not seem as if calls to commit violent activity, even if by well known ALF advocates, are particularly influential. That may be because ALF activists generally seem to operate locally[15] and may be unwilling to commit violence against people from their own community or who, on some level, they can empathize with. It can also be that the ALF activists, more so than their spokespeople, see value in and adhere to the dictum of non-violence. The central tenets of the ALF, including the one demanding non-violence, have remained unchanged for over ten years[16]

Some calls for violence, especially among ‘anonymous’ authors are suspected by many in the movement of being written by agents provocateurs that are attempting to further the interests of industries that use animals and their government sponsors by trying to make the ALF appear more violent than it is. One frequently cited document is “A Declaration Of War: Killing People To Save Animals And The Environment” written by ‘Screaming Eagle’ in 1991. The manifesto advocates a campaign of animal liberation with no limitations on who should be targeted or what methods are acceptable in furtherance of the cause of animal liberation.

The document has been labeled by AR advocates as fraudulent and written by animal industry supporters in order to discredit the AR movement.[17] Proponents of the industries that the ALF targets point to “A Declaration of War” as evidence of the violent nature of ALF and the need for enhanced state and federal legislation and enforcement activities against radical environmental groups.[18] While the intent of the author of the document will likely remain unknown the fact that this call to arms was written 15 years ago and has still not managed to incite any significant portion of the AR movement to violence in the U.S. is significant in demonstrating a lack of appetite among the ALF members to commit violent activity.

An undated, informal survey[19] posted on the ALF website asked respondents what they think should happen in a case where they had information that a laboratory was killing dogs. While committing violence wasn’t an option among the possible choices, it was noteworthy that only 16% of the 92 respondents advocated committing property damage and only two-thirds advocated trying to rescue the animals. Even in that case, there was an additional caveat that a rescue should only be attempted if the anonymity of the lab technician who reported the abuse could be maintained. Even though this survey was not scientific it’s notable for two reasons:

1) The survey was intended for an audience which was very sympathetic to animal rights. Respondents were described as ‘animal rights activists’ and could be expected to be more inclined to approve of direct action techniques than others, especially in a hypothetical situation where there were no actual risks to the respondent.

2) The fact that this was included in the group’s virtual library of documents alongside others that recommended more radical activity points to the ALF possessing an active philosophical component that has not settled on a dogmatic ideology.

Operations

Group leadership and Organizational Structure

An organization can be defined as “an administrative and functional structure”[20]. Consisting of self identified individuals who may organize into autonomous groups and have no formal leadership or structure, the ALF cannot be said to be an organization in the traditional sense. Drawing on strong anarchistic roots, the ALF is a loose network of like minded individuals who work towards a single goal under broad rules of conduct. In the words of one food industry spokesperson testifying before congress:

The ALF and ELF don’t really exist in the way we think of advocacy groups or even underground criminal movements like the Symbionese Liberation Army or the Weather Underground. ALF and ELF are labels of convenience, applied to crimes after the fact by individuals or small groups in order to draw public attention to their actions.[21]

Attempts to describe the ALF as having a more solid structure like “al-Qaeda, the IRA, and many African terrorist regimes”[22] are more a function of inherent assumptions by law enforcement and intelligence agencies of how criminal and terrorist organizations function than any evidence of true organization. Among the best evidence that the ALF rejects organization and structure is the fact that law enforcement has had so much difficulty in its efforts against it.

Membership into the ALF is not something that is awarded or granted but rather, anyone can become a member by adhering to the group’s principals:

  • To liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e. laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc., and place them in good homes where they may live out their natural lives, free from suffering.
  • To inflict economic damage to those who profit from the misery and exploitation of animals.
  • To reveal the horror and atrocities committed against animals behind locked doors, by performing non-violent direct actions and liberations.
  • To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human and non-human.
  • Must be vegetarian or vegan.

Estimates about the ‘membership’ of ALF activists are understandably difficult to make with any degree of certainty. What limited evidence exists leads some to believe that there are approximately 100 ‘hard core’ members active in the United States at any one time.[23] Activists seem to operate locally and are recruited while college age[24]. There is also some indication that the movement suffers from a high turnover rate due to members burning out and becoming ‘war weary’.[25]

Leadership is also difficult to identify within the ALF since the concept of leadership implies some sort of structure or hierarchy. Even in the most horizontal organization, some people are above others and have some sort of authority over them. The ALF seems to reject that notion at everything above the level of the individual cell and decision making within cells is not well documented.

There are a few individuals who act as spokespersons for the ALF or are well known within the AR community for working to develop moral and ethical philosophies but there is no individual or centrally recognized canon of AR literature whose word is recognized as commanding authority among all ALF members. A review of ALF electronic message boards reveals that the one consistent message that is adhered to by most ALF members is that each member must decide how to best achieve ALF’s goals individually. Messages frequent refer to anarchistic themes either explicitly or implicitly to underscore the highly individual nature of the movement.

Tactics

ALF members see themselves as being one part of a broad spectrum designed to end what they term ‘animal exploitation’. Only through applying a wide variety of tactics against different pressure points throughout society do ALF members believe they can achieve progress in their struggle. Lobbying, protesting, education and other legal forms of activism by legitimate organizations have their role as do property destruction and releasing (‘liberating’ in ALF terminology) captive animals by ALF and similar groups. Even groups which do advocate violent activity are not widely criticized by ALF members, rather they are seen as individuals just taking another path in their drive for animal liberation. Members of radical AR groups, including ALF, embrace that idea of the movement as a spectrum by moving frequently between legal and illegal methods and organizations.

The ALF occupies that part of the animal movement spectrum that includes illegal activities. Generally, most activities can be divided into three general categories: property damage, animal ‘liberation’ and harassment. The aims of property damage (which ranges from graffiti to arson) and animal liberation are to make a company’s operations prohibitively expensive through costs associated with replacing/repairing damaged equipment and animals, increased insurance premiums or enhanced security procedures. Harassment on the other hand, which may include destruction of a target’s personal property, is designed to induce so much anxiety and fear in the target and her family that she decides to sever her relationship with the company engaged in using animals.

A review of ALF communiqués about actions claimed over the past two years include a wide variety of property damage activity with the majority falling into the category of vandalism. Graffiti at fast food restaurants, breaking windows of furriers, and similar acts can be seen as crimes of convenience rather than part of a well planned campaign. There are a number of more serious crimes however that indicates significant amounts of planning and preparation. Breaking into laboratories or other business and destroying property or searching files for information about employees for further targeting demonstrates the potential to engage in highly sophisticated operations.[26]

Animal liberation usually occurs in conjunction with some property damage and involves ALF members either releasing captive animals into the wild or transporting them to other activists willing to provide the animals with care and shelter. Animal liberations get the most sympathy from the general public of all of ALFs activities and it is that tactic that frequently gets endorsed by ‘above ground’ AR groups.

Harassment can range from rather annoying tactics like sending ‘black faxes’, designed to use up all the toner in a facsimile machine by faxing a black piece of paper, to personal threats against people either on via phone/email or in person at work or at their homes. ALF members attempt to disrupt the life of their targets as much as possible through these actions.

As in all cases of terrorism, there are additional audiences beyond the specific targets. Other individuals and companies are expected to see the costs involved with rejecting the ALF demands and either proactively alter their policies or quickly respond when contacted by the ALF. Graffiti is prominently used at the homes of targets both to intimidate the victim and notify the surrounding community that a resident has attracted the attention of the ALF.

Probably the most remarked upon tactic of the AR movement is their use of secondary and tertiary targeting. Instead of only conducting operations against their primary target (animal laboratory, fur farm, restaurant, etc.), ALF members direct their attention to the customers, suppliers and others affiliated with the company in an effort to get them to stop doing business with them. One of the most successful examples of this occurred with a group similar to the ALF called Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC). In it’s campaign against a Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), SHAC has managed to pressure over 100 companies to sever ties with HLS and inflicting serious economic hardship on the company[27]. While SHAC and ALF are different organizations, the SHAC campaign demonstrates the value of the tactic. Many companies sever relations with the target company after getting their first warning making the tactic a very efficient and effective use of resources.

Apart from the broad principals accepted by ALF members there is no universally accepted tactic or anything expressly prohibited. Each ALF member/cell determines what or who it will target and what methods will be used. There is no component within ALF that could exercise any sort of guidance or control over individual members with regards to tactics, even if it wanted to.[28]

Alliances with other organizations or movements

In keeping with their view that they are one part of a much broader animal rights movement, ALF members express solidarity with virtually all groups with interests in animal rights. Before establishing a North American Press Office, ALF members frequently used the organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) to release statements and claim responsibility for their actions. PETA has provided funding to ALF members either for their criminal defense or employment with their organization.[29]

The clandestine nature of underground AR movements makes it difficult to determine the amount of cooperation between them, if any. Allegations have been made that radical AR activists use a variety of group names when claiming responsibility for their actions to confuse law enforcement, make their movement seem larger than it is and depending on the type of activity conducted.[30] Violent activity can be claimed by organizations which endorse those tactics thereby keeping the ALF non-violent principal in tact. There’s been no evidence that such a coordinated effort actually exists or if, instead, some members become more or less radical over time, or if there are, in fact, distinct groups which use different methods.

The U.S. has introduced several anti-terrorism laws post 9/11 which directly affects the ALF. Because penalties which can now be imposed and increased law enforcement attention to the subject, above ground animal rights groups have toned down their public support for the ALF. Virtually every group’s website has disclaimers clearly rejecting violence and criminal activity. How deeply those convictions are held is not known but many clearly maintain some sympathy for the radical AR movement either through statements of support for arrested ALF members or by advocating more general principals of animal liberation.

Outlook

The effectiveness of the ALF’s tactics are difficult to measure given the organization’s lack of structure and specific goals, its secretive nature and the inclination to attribute any criminal acts at companies that use animals as AR related but estimates claim that the ALF and related groups may have committed as many as 1,100 criminal acts that resulted in $110 million dollars in damages between 1976 and 2004.[31]

The federal government, in an attempt to become more effective in the fight against groups like the ALF, passed the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) in November of 2006 which would increase the options available to investigate and prosecute crimes federally and allow for enhanced penalties for those who target a wide range of companies that use animals in their business. The intent of the legislation was to create a significant enough set of disincentives that potential AR radicals would refrain from their criminal activities.

Government attempts at suppressing extremist AR activity are, at least partially, offset by a string of ‘victories’ they’ve experienced over the years. Pressuring companies to cease animal testing, stop doing business with others that continue testing or just avoiding being caught by law enforcement after being declared the most serious domestic terrorism threat in the United States all provide positive reinforcement to continue their activities. Finally, given that the FBI estimates over 1,200 AR incidents have occurred[32] and there have only been two prosecutions for AR crimes under these statutes in the past 15 years it is likely that there is little deterrent effect in such legislation.

Legislation which specifically targets AR groups does have a very profound, although unintended, effect however. Given the AR communitie’s strong ties to anarchist and left leaning political traditions, legislation which seems to target expression is another item on a growing list of ‘proofs’ that the government is attempting to restrict the rights of free speech and protest and make progressive social movements impotent. The focus of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies on AR activities are seen as a new wave of McCarthyism with environmentalists taking on the role of communists. Dubbed the ‘Green Scare’, animal and environmental radicals see the current environment one as one in which they are demonized in order for the government to tighten their control on society.[33]

By labeling the wide range of activities that animal rights extremists engage in as ‘terroristic’, the government is, perhaps intentionally, isolating those individuals from the rest of society. By doing so however they risk tapping into psychological factors that Franco Ferracuti identified as contributing to the extremism and violence of Italian terrorists from 1969-1986:

…belonging to a group and remaining isolated from society at large reinforces the terrorists’ ideology and strengthens their motivations. Deviants tend to group together and to cut their ties with society - which is seen as the alien and hostile enemy - and to engage in a ‘fantasy war’ with it - a war whose reality seems enhanced when that society engages in repressive action. Such actions reinforce the terrorists’ deviance and make it difficult for such people to make an exit from the life of terrorism.[34]

It’s not clear what the long term effect AETA will have on ALF activities. A review of communiqués issued by ALF cells since the act’s passage however revealed that it was mentioned in three out of nine actions.[35] In those cases along with accompanying press releases, ALF members were defiant and claimed that legislation would not cause them to cease their activities. It is certainly possible that ALF members will view AETA as another attempt by government and industry to restrict freedoms and crush dissent. Research has indicated that for extremist groups and gangs “the main sources of gang cohesiveness are external to the gangs, and the police will often perform that function.”[36] If, therefore, law enforcement can not disrupt the ALF sufficiently for it to disintegrate, the group could respond to increased attention by further radicalizing and becoming more violent. In short, legislation and anti-ALF actions by law enforcement might have the unintended consequence of making the ALF more violent and destructive rather than less.

For the dedicated supporters of the AR ideology, the threat of fines or imprisonment is simply not effective. Evidence suggests that incarceration makes most terrorists more connected to their cause and they do not hesitate to restart their activities upon release.[37] Activists within the animal rights community frequently site their arrest and incarceration as badges of honor and are afforded additional respect among their peers. An active prisoner support network as well as ostracizing those who cooperate with authorities further reinforce ideological commitment and reduce the deterrent effects of the use of anti-terrorism legislation against the ALF.

There is another risk of demonizing AR extremists that has not received significant attention. Jerrold Post has hypothesized that some terrorists are not primarily motivated by ideology but rather, they “are drawn to the path of terrorism in order to commit acts of violence”.[38] In this theory, individuals seeking justification for committing acts of terrorism look for some suitable outlet for their desires. Some may gravitate towards right-wing extremism or religious terrorism but the underlying message of the AR movement with its focus on injustice to helpless creatures, social equality and anti-authoritarianism may find greater resonance within a post 9/11 America than alternative choices. The increased attention that AR and ecological extremists have received from local, state and the federal government over the past years has increased the visibility of both movements and may have raised a banner for those looking for justify their destructive tendencies to rally around. Unfortunately, research has not sufficiently examined this question but given the generally poor state of research into terrorist motivation it must be considered.

The successes of the ALF and similar organizations over the past 30 years mean that it is highly unlikely that there will be significant drop off in ALF activity in the near future. ALF’s decentralized network doesn’t provide law enforcement with a leadership structure that can be targeted. Members don’t need to rely on any outside guidance and usually require minimal support making disruption of their activities difficult at best. Radical AR advocates see the consequences of failure in their mission as the reinforcement of violence in human behavior, the death of billions of living creatures (each one as morally entitled to life as any human) and complete ecological catastrophe. The stakes are so high, in the view of these AR activists, that it is too late for compromise or moderation and direct action is the only way to achieve success. Threats of prison terms are likely to do little more than feed their perceptions that there are no effective, legitimate alternative to encourage change within society. Rather than feeding that perception by branding all of their actions with the loaded term ‘terrorist’, there may be utility in exploring alternate means of changing their behaviors.

Bibliography

American Legislative Exchange Council. Animal & Ecological Terrorism in America. (Washington DC: American Legislative Exchange Council, 2003). Pg 7. www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/AnimalandEcologicalTerrorisminAmerica.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

Animal Liberation Front (ALF) Frequently Asked Questions. http://www.hedweb.com/alffaq.htm (accessed 6 May 2007)

Animal Liberation Front Animal Rights Activism FAQ. http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/FAQs/faq.htm (accessed 6 May 2007)

Animal Liberation Front Press Office http://www.animalliberationpressoffice.org/communiques_home.htm (accessed 6 May 2007)

Anonymous “A Real-Life ALF Case With Questions.” http://animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/Activist%20Tips/example_mission.htm (accessed 6 May 2007)

Best, Steven “Rethinking Revolution: Animal Liberation, Human Liberation, and the Future of the Left” http://animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/RethinkingRevolution.htm (accessed 6 May 2007)

Best, Steven and Anthony J. Nocella II, “Behind the Mask: Uncovering the Animal Liberation Front” in Terrorists or Freedom Fighters ed. Best, Steven and Anthony J. Nocella II (New York: Lantern) 2004.

Bjorgo, Tore, “How Gangs Fall Apart: Processes of Transformation and Disintegration of Gangs” Paper presented at the 51st Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology. Toronto, Canada, November 1999. http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/Toronto-paper.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

Borum, Randy. “Psychology of Terrorism”. (Tampa, Florida: University of South Florida), 2004

The Caterpillar, “Where Have They Gone?” Arkangel vol. 4 http://www.arkangelweb.org/archives/pdf/4/Ark4pt3.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

Eagan, Sean P., “From Spikes to Bombs: The Rise of Eco-Terrorism” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 19 (1996): 1-18

Monaghan, Rachel “Animal Rights and Violent Protest” Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 9 No. 4 (Winter 1997) pg. 106-16

Monaghan, Rachel “Terrorism in the Name of Animal Rights” The Future of Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc, 1997) pg. 165

Nephin, Dan “Eco-Terrorists’ elusiveness frustrate law enforcement in PA, ” The Associated Press, http://www.phillyburbs.com/pb-dyn/articlePrint.cfm?id=427264 (accessed 6 May 2007)

Post, Jerrold, “Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces” in Origins of Terrorism ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990)

Potter, Will “Green is the New Red” Counterpunch, 4 May 2006. http://counterpunch.org/potter05042006.html (accessed 6 May 2007)

Regan, Tom “Who Are Your Animal Rights Activists Anyway?” http://www.tomregan-animalrights.com/one.html (accessed 6 May 2007)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Judiciary. “Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality”, 108th Cong. 2004. Testimony of John E. Lewis. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:98179.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. “A Second Hearing on Eco-Terrorism Specifically Examining Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC)” Hearing 26 Oct 2005. 108th Congress http://www.furcommission.com/resource/SFresources/SHAChearing.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. “Oversight on Eco-terrorism specifically examining the Earth Liberation Front (”ELF”) and the Animal Liberation Front (”ALF”)”, Hearing 18 May 2005. 108th Congress. Testimony of David Martosko. http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=237826 (accessed 6 May 2007)

U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to Congress on the Extent and Effects of Domestic and International Terrorism on Animal Enterprises, Oct 1993. pg.28. http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/publicdocs/11-1prior/crm21.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)


[1] Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality, 108th Cong. 2004. Testimony of John E. Lewis. Retrieved http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:98179.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)[2] The FBI defines terrorism as, “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” FBI Counterterrorism Policy and Guidelines. http://jackson.fbi.gov/cntrterr.htm (accessed 6 May 2007)[3]American Legislative Exchange Council. Animal & Ecological Terrorism in America. (Washington DC: American Legislative Exchange Council, 2003). Pg 7. www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/AnimalandEcologicalTerrorisminAmerica.pdf (accessed 06 May 2007)[4] Sean P. Eagan, “From Spikes to Bombs: The Rise of Eco-Terrorism” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 19 (1996): 1-18

[5] Best, Steven and Anthony J. Nocella II, “Behind the Mask: Uncovering the Animal Liberation Front” in Terrorists or Freedom Fighters ed. Best, Steven and Anthony J. Nocella II (New York: Lantern) 2004.

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Steven Best “Rethinking Revolution: Animal Liberation, Human Liberation, and the Future of the Left” http://animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/RethinkingRevolution.htm (accessed 6 May 07)

[9] Animal Liberation Front (ALF) Frequently Asked Questions. http://www.hedweb.com/alffaq.htm (accessed 6 May 07)

[10] North American Animal Liberation Press Office, “Animal Activists Continue Campaign Against Abusers
Recent Amendments to Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act Spur Illegal Direct Action” http://www.animalliberationpressoffice.org/press_releases/pr_07_01_08_aeta.htm (accessed 6 May 07)

[11] Animal Rights Activism FAQ. http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/FAQs/faq.htm (accessed 6 May 07)

[12] Oversight on Eco-terrorism specifically examining the Earth Liberation Front (”ELF”) and the Animal Liberation Front (”ALF”), 108th Congress 2005. Testimony of David Martosko. Exhibit 30. From: http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=237826 (accessed 6 May 07)

[13] Animal Liberation Front (ALF) Frequently Asked Questions. http://www.hedweb.com/alffaq.htm (accessed 6 May 07)

[14] Best, Steven and Anthony J. Nocella II, “Behind the Mask: Uncovering the Animal Liberation Front” in Terrorists or Freedom Fighters ed. Best, Steven and Anthony J. Nocella II (New York: Lantern) 2004.

[15] Oversight on Eco-terrorism specifically examining the Earth Liberation Front (”ELF”) and the Animal Liberation Front (”ALF”), 108th Congress 2005. Testimony of David Martosko. Exhibit 24. From: http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=237826 (accessed 6 May 07)

[16] Rachel Monaghan “Animal Rights and Violent Protest” Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 9 No. 4 (Winter 1997) pg. 106-16

[17] Tom Regan “Who Are Your Animal Rights Activists Anyway?” http://www.tomregan-animalrights.com/one.html (accessed 6 May 2007)

[18]American Legislative Exchange Council. Animal & Ecological Terrorism in America. (Washington DC: American Legislative Exchange Council, 2003). Pg9. www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/AnimalandEcologicalTerrorisminAmerica.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

[19]A Real-Life ALF Case With Questions.” http://animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/Activist%20Tips/example_mission.htm (accessed 6 May 2007)

[20] http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/organization (accessed 6 May 2007)

[21] Oversight on Eco-terrorism specifically examining the Earth Liberation Front (”ELF”) and the Animal Liberation Front (”ALF”), 108th Congress 2005. Testimony of David Martosko. From: http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=237826 (accessed 6 May 2007)

[22] American Legislative Exchange Council. Animal & Ecological Terrorism in America. (Washington DC: American Legislative Exchange Council, 2003). Pg. 9 www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/AnimalandEcologicalTerrorisminAmerica.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

[23] U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to Congress on the Extent and Effects of Domestic and International Terrorism on Animal Enterprises, Oct 1993. pg.28. http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/publicdocs/11-1prior/crm21.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

[24] Dan Nephin “Eco-Terrorists’ elusiveness frustrate law enforcement in PA, ” The Associated Press, http://www.phillyburbs.com/pb-dyn/articlePrint.cfm?id=427264 (accessed 6 May 2007)

[25] The Caterpillar, “Where Have They Gone?” Arkangel vol. 4 http://www.arkangelweb.org/archives/pdf/4/Ark4pt3.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

[26]North American Animal Liberation Front Press Office http://www.animalliberationpressoffice.org/communiques_home.htm (accessed 6 May 2007)

[27] United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. “A Second Hearing on Eco-Terrorism Specifically Examining Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC)” Hearing 26 Oct 2005. 108th Congress http://www.furcommission.com/resource/SFresources/SHAChearing.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

[28] Rachel Monaghan “Terrorism in the Name of Animal Rights” The Future of Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc, 1997) pg. 165

[29] Oversight on Eco-terrorism specifically examining the Earth Liberation Front (”ELF”) and the Animal Liberation Front (”ALF”), 108th Congress 2005. Testimony of David Martosko. From: http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=237826 (accessed 6 May 2007)

[30] U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report to Congress on the Extent and Effects of Domestic and International Terrorism on Animal Enterprises, Oct 1993. pg.28. http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/publicdocs/11-1prior/crm21.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

[31] Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality, 108th Cong. 2004. Testimony of John E. Lewis. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:98179.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

[32] Frieden, Terry. “FBI, ATF address domestic terrorism.” CNN.com, May 19, 2005. http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/05/19/domestic.terrorism/ (accessed 6 May 2007)

[33] Will Potter, “Green is the New Red” Counterpunch, 4 May 2006. http://counterpunch.org/potter05042006.html (accessed 6 May 2007)

[34] Franco Ferracuti, “Ideology and repentance: Terrorism in Italy” in Origins of Terrorism ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990),61.

[35] North American Animal Liberation Front Press Office http://www.animalliberationpressoffice.org/communiques_home.htm (accessed 6 May 2007) Only actions which took place in the United States were considered in the review.

[36] Tore Bjorgo, “How Gangs Fall Apart: Processes of Transformation and Disintegration of Gangs” Paper presented at the 51st Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology. Toronto, Canada, November 1999. http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/Toronto-paper.pdf (accessed 6 May 2007)

[37] Borum, Randy. Psychology of Terrorism. (Tampa, Florida: University of South Florida), 2004. 39

[38] Jerrold Post, “Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces” in Origins of Terrorism ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990),25.

 





A rose by any other name…

18 09 2007

What is a gang? The question isn’t as simple as it might appear, especially once you get beyond the easy cases of guys wearing red, calling each other ‘dawg’ and selling narcotics. NJ statue defines a gang as:

“…three or more persons associated in fact. Individuals are associated in fact if (1) they have in common a group name or identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other physical marking, style of dress or use of hand signs or other indicia of association or common leadership, and (2) individually or in combination with other members of a criminal street gang, while engaging in gang related activity, have committed, conspired or attempted to commit , within the preceding three years, two or more offenses of robbery, carjacking, aggravated assault, assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, extortion, or a violation of chapter 11, section 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 of chapter 35 or chapter 39 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes regardless of whether the prior offenses have resulted in convictions.”

That’s not a great definition (what’s ‘gang-related activity’?) but even if it was right on target we’d have problems defining gangs and gang members.

I’d recommend checking out this paper about one of the issues we face when discussing gnags. The paper argues that the threat of gangs in schools have been overestimated and that gang classifications have been biased against racial minorities.

The paper begins with a good example on the (mis)uses of surveys in its study of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). Their survey asked several questions about gang activity beginning with the statement:

“We’d like to know a little more about any gangs at or around your school. You may know these as street gangs, fighting gangs, crews, or something else. For this survey, we are interested in gangs that may or may not be involved in violent or illegal activity.” (italics added)

First, why would anyone be asking about, or interested in, groups not involved in illegal activity? I couldn’t help thinking about efforts by law enforcement and the DoD to track other law abiding groups: (here and here, and here) and wonder if there’s just a general ‘culture of suspicion’ about anyone not ‘like us’. The consequences of going down this road is that instead of doing the (admittedly difficult) task of actually assessing threats we end up with a grab bag that consists of criminals, law abiding anti-establishment groups, and weirdos. That forces us to spread our collection and analytical resources that much more thinly.

But I digress….

Next is a section titled ‘Gangs and Racial Stereotypes’. It outlines the current problems with gang databases (easy to get put in them, almost impossible to get off them, gang-related versus gang motivated) which have been discussed numerous times but not generally in law enforcement circles.

But, by far, the best part of the paper begins on page 962 in the section titled ‘Gangs, Race and Social Class’ (if you don’t read the whole paper the section from 962-975 is worthy of your attention). Examining several incidents (the Columbine killings, the Spur Posse, and The Saints and the Roughnecks) the authors make a convincing case that race and social class have much more to do with classifying groups as gangs than we’re aware and plays some role in common stereotypes that gangs are primarily a function of minorities and the poor.

So what does this mean for us? Well, check out assessments, articles, web sites, etc. dealing with gangs after you read this and I’d be willing to bet you’ll see some of the same issues the authors point out. Are we missing threats because our internal and institutional biases are preventing us from seeing them properly?





Street gangs and gang strategy

30 08 2007

Last month, the Justice Policy Institute published a report titled “Gang Wars: The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective Public Safety Strategies“. The subtitle kind of gives away the central idea of the report but it’s still worth checking out. It gives one of the best reviews of current gang thought out there and dispels a lot of ‘conventional wisdom‘ that’s bandied about. Some of the key findings:

  • Gangs do not dominate or drive the drug trade.
  • Most gang members join when they are young and quickly outgrow their gang affiliation without the
    help of law enforcement or gang intervention programs.
  • Most youth who join gangs do so between the ages of 12 and 15, but the involvement of younger children
    in gangs is not new.
  • Heavy-handed suppression efforts can increase gang cohesion and police-community tensions,
    and they have a poor track record when it comes to reducing crime and violence.

They do a great job of profiling some high profile anti-gang strategies and how they do (or more usually don’t) work.

Unfortunately, I fear this work will be quickly ignored. The fact is that the law enforcement-industrial complex (and I write that only slightly tongue in cheek. A considerable industry had arisen around the law enforcement process with consultants, private prisons, specialty software, training, etc.) has a lot invested in there being no significant change to how we deal with gangs and gang crime. In spite of that, the research is becoming overwhelming that endless cycle of crime-arrest-incarceration isn’t going to be broken by hiring more cops or building more prisons. A few agencies recognize this and are trying to adapt but most don’t do much more than adopt some of the terminology and trappings of the new findings and then do the same old things that haven’t worked for years.

The report isn’t particularly optimistic even for those areas that want to do more than arrest everyone wearing a red shirt and a bandanna hanging out of their pocket. The fact is that there aren’t many agencies or community groups that have resources or organization that can match what law enforcement can mobilize. That means that virtually any plan, no matter how well thought out, is likely to have a weak, disorganized social/community aspect and a vigorous law enforcement component. It’s like a body builder who only lifts with one arm and lets the other atrophy.

Check out the report. It’s well worth the time you’ll spend on it.

Update: I forgot to mention that one of the authors of the report was recently interviewed on NPR. He talks about the hyping of MS-13 as the nation’s ‘most dangerous gang’. It got that moniker, in part, because of a bogus story that came out a few years ago that MS-13 was partnering up with al-Qaeda to smuggle terrorists into the U.S. (I believe the origins of that story had much more to do with law enforcement anti-gang units trying to cash in on all that homeland security money that was flowing like the mighty Mississip after 9/11) plus there were a number of high profile violent crimes committed by MS-13 members that took place in the Washington D.C. metro area in 2005/2006. When the people who work in the D.C. area got caught up in the hysteria, their influence spread throughout the rest of the country and so MS-13 became a sort of ‘bogey man‘. It doesn’t hurt that MS-13 members are Central American and so can further stoke the xenophobia about illegal aliens.





How are we doing? Metrics for the GWOT and beyond…

28 03 2007

Way back in 2003, Donald Rumsfeld wrote a famous memo asking how we were doing in the ‘War on Terror’. The famous line quoted is:

Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?

Now, never mind that the question itself makes all sorts of assumptions that may or may not be true (are madrassas pumping out terrorists like factories make widgets? Are our opponents so organized that they are consciously deploying their ‘assets’ against us in a monolithic, systematic fashion? Are the clerics the ones doing the recruiting?). Also, forget the whole problem with the concept of a ‘War on Terror’ which, as many people have pointed out, is completely nonsensical (hey, let’s have a war on AK-47s! Or, maybe a war on sieges!) since you can only have a war against people (and sometimes intelligent robots or zombies) and not concepts, tactics, diseases or poverty.

The point is that, we’ve had a great deal of difficulty in identifying reliable benchmarks to determine what is going on in our various efforts. The old fall back is body counts which everyone seems to say isn’t good yet just about every day there’s another press release about how many ‘insurgents’ or ‘terrorists’ were killed (and the inevitable controversy about how many of them were actually women, children or wedding guests).

I saw a speaker recently who attempted to lay out some potential metrics for judging our progress against Al-Qaeda. His list (along with my explanatory comments) was:

  • Initiative- who has it? Who’s on the offensive and the defensive? Are we waiting for the attack or ‘leaning forward’ and preventing attacks or (even better) disrupting networks to the point that they can’t organize or even plan coherently.
  • Safe Havens- Are there areas ‘off limits’ to them or us?
  • Freedom of action-To what extent to obstacles interfere with their (or our) activities and plans
  • Network building- How easy is it to develop relationships, allies, and partners?
  • State Sponsorship- Not only the existence of sponsorship but also the degree to which it is overt or covert
  • Finances- What financial resources do they have? How easily can they access, transfer, use their money?
  • Personnel-How many members do they have? Is recruitment exceeding attrition? What types (demographics, socio-economic characteristics) of people are they attracting? What skills do they have/want?
  • Leadership-Centralized or diffused? What type of structure would they want to have?
  • Tactics-Why are they using the tactics they use? Are there preferred tactics they are unable to use?
  • Strategy- What is the master plan? How has/is it evolving?
  • Battle of ideas- How is the conflict seen outside of it’s boundaries? What group(s) are supporting which side?
  • Public Opinion- How are the various sides seen by the ‘domestic’ population (the area where the conflict is being played out)? What group(s) are supporting which side?

I got to thinking about the general lack of discussion about the use of metrics in law enforcement. For years the law enforcement community has relied on the civilian equivalent of body counts…arrests and drug seizures. Even though everyone likes to point to those figures as examples of progress the fact remains that they don’t really tell you anything about how effective our tactics are in combating criminal activities. What those figures are very good at doing is justifying budgets, padding resumes, and justifying promotions.

It’s a bit of a cliche now to say that we won’t arrest our way out of our crime problems but there hasn’t been much discussion about how we change the way law enforcement actually does something different from the old “Book ‘em Dano” mentality.

I’m wondering if solutions to criminality (at least endemic criminality as seen in many urban, economically depressed areas) should be viewed more broadly with metrics like those mentioned above used to both determine progress and, more importantly, areas that the state should focus its resources on.

Lest anyone think that the above metrics are too ‘touchy feely’ and that only hard numbers will be acceptable, I think in many (although not all, the issue is just to complicated to reduce to a checklist) cases you could come up supporting metrics that support some of these more general categories. Want an example? Well, you’re going to get one anyway….

To support the ‘Public Opinion’ category, you could look at the number of tips coming in to authorities from the area in question (not including people looking to trade information for reduced sentences or otherwise avoid punishment) the number of people from these areas who are joining organizations closely associated with the establishment (police, military, fire departments, etc.) as a sign that the local population is giving allegiance to legal institutions.





How much dope are we growing???

19 12 2006

I saw this article today which describes a report that estimated that marijuana is the largest cash crop produced in the U.S., eclipsing both corn and wheat. The author of the report is Jon Gettman, a proponent of marijuana legalization and one time director of NORML.

So, clearly the author has a slant. If he can demonstrate that marijuana is such a huge crop, he can make the argument that 1) eradication efforts are a failure and 2) if there’s such a huge supply there must be a significant demand as well. Given that we don’t have wacked out pot heads on every street corner perhaps marijuana isn’t as dangerous as has been alleged?

Still the article did make some interesting points that might indicate that the report shouldn’t be discarded out of hand.

First was this statement:

Tom Riley, a spokesman for the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy, said he could not confirm the report’s conclusions on the size of the country’s marijuana crop. But he said the government estimated overall U.S. illegal drug use at $200 billion annually.

Obviously, the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy is as concerned about keeping marijuana illegal as Mr. Gettman is about making it legal so the inability to offer a differing estimate of the size of the U.S. marijuana crop leads me to believe that either they essentially agree with the estimates but don’t want to legitimize the study by saying so or don’t have estimates of their own (either because they don’t have the capability or intent to get them).

Gettman’s pricing estimation seems to be a bit hinky at first glance since, according to the article:

He calculated the producer price per pound of marijuana at $1,606 based on national survey data showing retail prices of between $2,400 and $3,000 between 2001 and 2005…

…By comparison, the United States produced an average of nearly $23.3 billion worth of corn annually from 2003 to 2005, $17.6 billion worth of soybeans, $12.2 billion worth of hay, nearly $11.1 billion worth of vegetables and $7.4 billion worth of wheat, the report said.

In other words, he used retail prices (which will obviously be much higher that producer prices) of marijuana and compared them to wholesale (which will be much lower) prices of corn, soybeans, hay and wheat.

He does address this in the report however:

Furthermore the market prices frequently quoted by law enforcement in news accounts often represent retail or end-user prices whereas the price level used in this report is meant to provide an estimated value at the producer level. The price and yield indices used in this report represent a value of $702 per outdoor plant and $351 per indoor plant. These are conservative estimates that take into account less than optimal yield and production by many producers due to inexperience, lack of access to high-yield genetic stock, lack of sophisticated technology, cultivation for non-market personal use, and cultivation in marginal locations lacking sufficient space, sunlight, water, or fertilizer for optimal production.

I’m not sure if these are, in fact, ‘conservative estimates’ but it seems to make sense. He goes on further to describe the process by which he came up with his pricing methodology.

The framework producing this figure was based on assumptions that a wholesale price would be 83.5% of retail, a distributor price would be 67.5% of retail, a farm price would be at 50% of retail, and that the producer price index would be set at halfway between the farm and distributor prices to reflect differences in supply networks in terms of the number of intermediaries between end-use customers and producers. These are simplifying assumptions
that are generally consistent with market conditions as reported in the press and government reports.

I’m not an economist but that seems legit.

The policy recommendations are interesting as well. He begins by outlining the DEA’s Domestic Cannabis Eradication/Suppression Program and saying that despite being “well-run” and “well-funded” (I’m not sure what criteria he used to apply those terms) it hasn’t made much of an impact on the marijuana production system. Well, other than creating more growers:

Indeed an unintended effect of publicity about program successes such as arrests and seizures has been to promote market participation. News
about seizures of marijuana plots and grow rooms widely advertises the high prices and profit potential associated with the cultivation of high quality marijuana.

I wish he had some hard evidence to back up that statement but it seems like he slid it in there. Without some sourcing or proof we might have to discount that one.

Check out the whole report (it’s a total of 29 pages so not a terrible burden) here.

I have to admit, while I’m not a dope smoker (just smelling it gives me a wicked headache) or a grower (not only do I have trouble keeping plastic plants from dying but live marijuana makes me sneeze like crazy) but legalization just seems to make more and more sense. Think of the tax receipts we could collect off of that crop!





My beef with animal-rights analysis

13 09 2006

As you may know, one of my pet-peeves is how the law enforcement/intelligence communities react to the animal rights movement*. In May of 2005, the FBI declared that animal rights and eco-terrorist groups posed the most serious threats to the nation. I remember when I first read that the word that immediately came to mind was hyperbole. Law enforcement assessments of the threat posed by the animal rights movement (hereafter referred to as ‘AR’) suffers from several serious flaws. Here’s a rundown (in no particular order) of some of the most egregious as well as what is required to correct them:

  1. “They’re all the same.”: In every assessment of the AR movement (whether of a specific group of the movement as a whole), I’ve seen, analysis treats the entire movement as a monolithic entity. Chronologies of AR activities tend to group the activities of several organizations into one timeline, creating the impression that everything is highly organized and conforming to some sort of ‘master plan’. That may very well be true (I doubt it, but it’s possible) but that assumption has never been explicitly articulated or been supported with any sort of evidence. This would be just like saying that because some police officers were implicated in racial profiling years ago we have to assume that all cops are racists and will be forever. The fact is that the AR movement (like any political movement) has members with divergent opinions, even among those who would advocate direct action.
  2. What happens in Vegas…happens everywhere else”: In addition to portraying everyone in the AR community as being in ideological lock-step, the intel community makes the assertion that the M.O. of one animal rights group is automatically that of all AR groups. This only works in one direction, however. So, you’ll see plenty of assessments that highlight the most illegal activities by AR activists (which usually occur in Europe) as evidence that AR activists here in the U.S. are highly dangerous. I’ve yet to see any sort of argument that explains why it is that what happens in England today (or, even more outrageously, what happened in England in 199 8) is relevant to New Jersey in 2006. I haven’t even seen an argument for why AR activity in the Pacific Northwest is relevant to us.**
  3. “Stop being mean!”: Because of these shortfalls every “analysis” of AR I’ve seen resorts to an appeal to emotion to get the reader to agree that AR activists are evil terrorists. In order to do this they include incidents that, while socially unappealling, are totally legal. They’re cheap theatrics designed to elicit a favorable response based on emotions because, in most cases, there’s not enough solid information to elict a favorable one based on reason. Is it impolite to tell a child that his/her daddy kills puppies for a living? Absolutely. Is it illegal? No. Is somebody who does this sort of thing a terrorist? No way!
  4. “How dare they obey the law!” In testimony before the subcommitte of Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security on 23 May, 2006, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General advocated strengthening the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act because: “…animal rights extremists have recognized limits and ambiguities in the statute and have tailored their campaign to exploit them…”. Let me put that into plain english: “They read the law and aren’t breaking it. So, we need to change the law so we can prosecute them because we don’t like them.” Let me put it another way, imagine you were driving down the highway and saw a speed limit sign. When you see it, you adjust your speed accordingly so you don’t break the law (ok, it’s just an example, imagine you actually obey the speed limit). This argument says that you’re exploiting an obvious loophole in the law and they should lower the speed limit to a point where you can’t avoid breaking it. This implies that the decision has been made that these groups must, by definition, be terrorist groups and therefore actions they carry out should be considered illegal. Also, couldn’t you use that same quote about every person who files income taxes in the U.S.? Don’t we all ‘recognize limits and ambiguities in the tax code and tailor our actions to exploit them’? You bet your 1040EZ we do! Does that mean we’re all criminals?
  5. “The sky is falling!”: We’ve defined ‘threat’ as the point at which capabilities and intent intersect. The U.S. Army has the capability to destroy New York City but doesn’t have the intent, therefore it’s not a threat. Some nut wearing a tin foil hat may have the intent to blow up the world but doesn’t have the capability, therefore he’s not a threat. When it comes to the AR movement there hasn’t been a careful examination of their capabilities or intent. In most assessments I’ve seen, there is a continued emphasis on the threat of violent activity even though there’s little actual history of it. The vast majority of AR activists involved in direct action are dedicated to non-violence (as far as I’ve been able to determine, no one in the U.S. has ever died, or been targeted for death as a result of AR activity. If I’m wrong on this point, please let me know) and have limited resources. I would argue that there are a host of terrorist and criminal organizations active in our area that pose much more significant threats both to the safety of individual citizens and our economic interests and yet garner less attention and fewer dedicated resources from law enforcement.

Ok…so what’s the big deal? Good question, I’m glad you asked. In addition to possibly diverting resources away from more significant threats, it is entirely possible that our current path of widely labeling and pursuing AR groups as terrorists (as opposed to just treating them as regular criminals when they break the law) may actually encourage the more violent and destructive behavior on their part. In his paper “How Gangs Fall Apart”, (and I think AR groups could be included in this characterization) Tore Bjorgo writes “…the main sources of gang cohesiveness are external to the gangs, and the police will often perform that function.” I can’t find the source now but I remember reading a document about the psychology of terrorists. Among other characteristics, they were reported to be more likely to have persecution or messiah complexes. Many AR activists believe that they are initiating a second civil rights movement or even working to stop a second holocaust (feeding the Messiah complex - working to save those who can’t save themselves). Couple that with having, as an opponent, the multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry and the muscle of the law enforcement community and you can see the forces pushing both for group cohesion and feeding the persecution complex). In short, our tactics now are basically a huge recruiting campaign for anyone who may be psychologically inclined towards terrorist activity but not sympathetic to radical Islam or other extremist ideologies (white supremacism, for example). This post is getting long so next time I visit this subject I’ll discuss what good AR analysis should consist of and how we should think about going about it. I’m hoping this post will spark some discussion, both pro and con about some of the ideas I’ve put forward here today.

*A disclaimer: Just to keep everything on the up and up…you should know that I do have sympathies with elements of the animal rights philosophy. I do, however, firmly reject both the goals and tactics of the more radical followers of the animal liberation movement.

**There seems to be something about the British/European culture that makes people more inclined to get involved with politically motivated direct action (and violent/illegal action). I think that may explain why we haven’t seen anywhere near the amount of violent/criminal action by animal/eco rights activists here in the U.S. as they experience in Europe. It certainly isn’t the lack of skills training, motivation, or intelligence. As a hypothesis, I’d say it might that Americans are discouraged from an early age from getting directly involved in political issues and rather encouraged to take action by writing a check instead. Europeans are much more connected with political activism (in part through a much stronger tradition of trade union activity) so it’s much more natural to ‘take up the cross’ on issues of importance. European activists (on all sides of the political spectrum) have a long history of crossing over into ‘criminal’ activity that I just don’t know we share to the same degree. I haven’t seen the case made for this migration of tactics and I notice that the vast majority of eco-activists in the U.S. emphasize their commitment to non-violent activity (I’m not sure of the influence of the few advocating violence but I think the fact that there haven’t been any significant events is interesting and uniformly overlooked in the intelligence community)