Failed cities

The Philadelphia Inquirer continues its special report on the failed city of Camden, NJ and I keep finding parallels between that and attempts to stabilize failed states or assist developing nations improve their standards of living.

Many aid projects in the developed world (and, increasingly China which I’m not sure is ‘officially’ part of the developed world)  are big, expensive infrastructure projects like dams, roads, resource extraction plants and such.  Such projects are usually announced with much fanfare, proclaiming millions (or billions!) going to a particular country.  Yet most of the money doesn’t go into the local economy at all.  Outside companies plan and manage the project, consultants and labor is imported.  Revenue gets funneled to corrupt local politicians or is siphoned out to the company(ies) that ran the project.  Not surprisingly, the estimated boom in economic activity doesn’t pan out and the country ends with little to show for all the money except (usually) being on the wrong end of a bad business deal.  How does Camden stack up compared with that?

The landmark 2002 Municipal Rehabilitation and Economic Recovery Act that put Camden under state control set aside $175 million for dozens of city projects. And none was larger, or more emblematic, than the $25 million expansion of the 10-year-old, state-owned aquarium.

Camden’s residents were told the recovery would help to lift them out of poverty. The state’s “strategic revitalization plan,” the recovery’s guide, even listed jobs as the No. 1 goal.  But it didn’t turn out that way. Instead, most of the bailout money, $99 million, was allocated to the aquarium and other “anchor” institutions: tourist attractions, universities, hospitals, and government agencies…only 23 percent of [the aquarium's] employees – 28 percent during the summer – live in Camden. Before the recovery, the percentage of Camden residents employed there was 43 percent.

At Rutgers-Camden law school, the $11 million for an expansion project helped to increase the hours of free legal work students provide city residents from about 30,000 to 40,000 hours a year…But the school’s expansion led to only one new job for a Camden resident, a custodial position.

More than 40 percent of the population is living under the poverty line, and the tax base has shrunk.

Camden is the second most dangerous city in America and the poorest medium-sized city, according to national rankings. The city of 70,390 had 1,791 violent crimes in 2008, compared to 1,711 the year before the recovery began.

The central idea to the ‘revitalization’ scheme was to develop the waterfront area of Camden with tourist attractions, high cost condos and homes and perhaps some corporate headquarters.  All of which guarantee the residents of Camden nothing but low wage, service sector jobs.  The unspoken part of these revitalization plans is that if they can ‘gentrify’ the city they can then begin to squeeze existing residents out of the area.  Where they go is unimportant so long as it’s somewhere else.  At that point they become someone else’s problem and everyone can declare victory for ‘turning around’ a depressed city.

This story reminded me of a recent Planet Money podcast in which an author of a new book called The Aid Trap argues that aid based upon the Marshall Plan would be much better than our current system.  Specifically, focus on giving money directly to local, mid-sized businesses (from 1 to several dozen employees generally) which are the real generators of economic activity.  Of course, Camden also presents an opportunity to really think outside the box.  Why does it need to still be a city?  With over 1,500 properties abandoned and large tracts of land set aside  is there room to create a modern, self sufficient city-state?  Even if we don’t go that far, how about establishing a plan which will allow the citizens of Camden to take a greater role in their own urban regeneration?

A failed strategy

See if you can guess which failed state/insurgency/peacekeeping operation/etc. this article refers to.  I’m only omitting details which might give away the answer.

Raw sewage seeped into Mr. and Mrs G’s basement, through its bathroom, hallway, and bedroom.  The fumes forced the family to eat outside and sent [their] 1-year-old [son] to the emergency room three times with respiratory problems. The toxic flow burned holes in walls and ruined clothes and a sofa.  The sewage comes from a collapsed pipe at the end of their block… in City X. How does the city respond? For three hours, three days a week, a bored employee uses a noisy machine to transfer waste from the busted sewer into one that works.  This jury-rigged solution has been in place for more than a year.

City X is so broke, so unable to perform the basic functions of government, that the obvious solution – repairing the century-old brick sewer system – is almost impossible to achieve, fiscally and politically.  Seven years ago, [the government]  rolled out a revitalization plan…[the city] would be taken over, repaired, and put on a path to self-reliance.

[The Government] gave City X $175 million in bonds and loans, plus a one-time $7.5 million appropriation from the [government's] budget, in exchange for an appointed chief operating officer to run the government and for control over the school board. [The] plan would create jobs, improve the quality of life, decrease crime, demolish all unsafe vacant buildings, lure new businesses, and, yes, mend sewers.

• X’s residents are just as poor today and just as likely to be murdered. They are just as unemployed and lacking in the skills to succeed at work. Their children’s reading and math skills are just as abysmal. And the city is twice as reliant on [taxes from other areas] as before.
• The law replaced the political power of X’s most significant advocates – its 70,390 residents – with a murky bureaucracy unable to govern. [The government has] said some control could return to city leaders by the end of the year, but gave no specifics.
• The law also said [the government] would “provide the necessary level of funding to allow for the demolition of unsafe structures,” but more than 1,500 such buildings remain, as drug dens, fire hazards, and eyesores.
• Less than 5 percent of the $175 million recovery package was spent on the things residents care about most: crime, city schools, job training, and municipal services.
• Nearly $100 million of the $170 million spent so far went to construction projects for large institutions, like a law school and an aquarium. And much of the construction work was handled by contractors and [interest groups] that contribute to the authors of the takeover law.

Anyone care to guess?  An Iraqi city in 2007?  Kandahar?  Sierra Leone?

Nope.  Camden, New Jersey.

And this is why I think that some form of COIN doctrine may be applicable to our most depressed cities.  The rule of law has collapsed.  People’s safety is at almost constant risk.  The government can’t (or won’t) provide basic services.  Infrastructure and the local economy are in shambles.

And so the answer to these problems is to throw money into a number of pet projects randomly, make a bunch of street level arrests of easily replaceable drug dealers (who are frequently kept in business by suburbanites) and disenfranchise the population?

Where’s the equivalent of the CERP?  Where’s the dedication to public safety demonstrated by having security personnel stationed among the population (as opposed to rushing from emergency call to call or following the gunshots)?  Where’s the institution and confidence building measures to let the local population take control of their city?

In the article, the reporter interviewed NJ Governor John Corzine.

He described Camden as a “50-year problem” that won’t be fixed in seven

That prediction will come true if we continue with the same old failed strategies.  And if Camden was the only city in this shape in the region or the country we could live with it.  But really, how long are we going to write off these cities, their populations (American citizens, I might add) and the instability that their decrepit conditions lead to?

Another nail in the prohibition coffin?

The Washington Post has an interesting opinion piece by Peter Moskos showing an alternative system to our drug war.

As a police officer, I responded when citizens called 911 to report drug dealing. Those calls didn’t tell me much, though, because I already knew the drug corners. And what could I do? When a police car pulls up to a drug corner, the corner pulls back. Dealers, friends, addicts and lookouts walk slowly away…

But soon enough I’d have to answer another 911 call for drugs. And when I left, the crew would reconvene. One of my partners put it succinctly: “We can’t do anything. Drugs were here before I was born, and they’re going to be here after I die. All they pay us to do is herd junkies.

As I’ve said many, many times, that’s a function of our current law enforcement regime.  Departments (and officers) are rewarded for making arrests and seizures of illegal material.  The easiest people to arrest are drug users, who are committing a crime by possessing and using drugs as well as the numerous crimes of opportunity they engage in to acquire more drugs so they overwhelmingly are the ones who get arrested.

But, arrests shouldn’t be an end in themselves.  The goal should be reduced crime and increased public safety.  Making arrests the only tool we use to get there would be like…using military force to solve every diplomatic problem we encounter.

Without declaring a war, authorities there have managed to lower addiction rates, limit use and save lives. The United States, by contrast, spends $50 billion a year on its war on drugs and leads the world in illegal drug use, with millions of Americans regularly using marijuana, cocaine and ecstasy.

In Amsterdam, the red-light district is the oldest and most notorious neighborhood. Two picturesque canals frame countless small pedestrian alleyways lined with legal prostitutes, bars, porn stores and coffee shops. In 2008, I visited the local police station and asked about the neighborhood’s problems. I laughed when I heard that dealers of fake drugs were the biggest police issue — but it’s true. If fake-drug dealers are the worst problem in the red-light district, clearly somebody is doing something right.

The results are telling. In America, 37 percent of adults have tried marijuana; in the Netherlands the figure is 17 percent. Heroin usage rates are three times higher in the United States than in the Netherlands. Crystal meth, so destructive here, is almost nonexistent there. By any standard — drug usage rates, addiction, homicides, incarceration and dollars spent — America has lost the war on drugs.

Now, I’ve talked to people who give me the old “Yeah, but that wouldn’t work here.  Our population is different.”  Like all those windmills and wooden shoes makes a kindlier, gentler breed of criminal.  I’m not sure that’s it at all, however and suspect that it might have a lot more to do with all of the unexamined assumptions we have about crime, criminals and deterrence.  Of course, it’d be nice to actually try an alternate approach to see if it works without having to worry about a bunch of yahoos screeching about how we’re just coddling criminals.

But that, in itself, is a telling response.  I wonder if crime prevention figures into how most people think about criminal justice or if crime punishment is more important.

Still, the fact that these sorts of discussions are happening more frequently is a good sign.  maybe we can get away from this hamster on a wheel drug war and start the serious work of making our neighborhoods, towns and cities safer.  As Moskos says about the Dutch:

Police in the Netherlands are not involved in a drug war; they’re too busy doing real police work.

New event for 2016 Olympics: the Helicopter Shoot down

Oh yeah.  I’m sure the Olympic Committee is shocked…SHOCKED to hear that there’s rampant crime in Rio!  Hey, but that’s OK.  The Brazilian delegation somehow reassured the committee that they’d be able to keep the athletes, spectators, media and others safe but the committee might be having a bit of buyers remorse now.

Smoke rose from the smoldering wreckage of a police helicopter shot down by drug gangs Saturday, while eight buses burned and gunfire filled the air in the slum of Morro dos Macacos.

I’m wondering if there was another Olympic venue that was as much of a security nightmare as Rio will be.

Setting ourselves up for tragedy

I’m not sure I actually have to say that I’m not too sympathetic towards sex offenders but I do think that we should do what we can to prevent them from re-offending.  Some ways to do that include not labeling people for life as dangerous deviants for engaging in consensual relationships while minors, ‘mooning’ or streaking.  For those who are legitimately guilty of crimes against minors, identify those who can be helped with treatment and give it to them.  For those who are the true, irredeemable predators, alter the laws to make sure they can’t endanger the public.

However, stupid laws which push all offenders outside of society are only going to make all of them more likely to commit more crimes.  When you say that offenders can’t live, work or be within some arbitrary distance from every school, bus stop, play ground, etc. you’re going to end up with a whole bunch of ex-convicts congregating together and interacting with no one else.  Take away every option from people other than committing crimes and should we be surprised when they re-offend?

My Artic Sea fix

I just can’t quit this story.

Somehow I missed this interesting piece of information.  When the Ruskies went to pick up the ‘hijackers’ and the crew of the Artic Sea they used three IL-76 aircraft to do it.

For those of you unfamiliar with the IL-76, it is described as a “medium-range military transport aircraft”.  Now why exactly would three aircraft with a payload capacity of 45 tons each be needed to carry two or three dozen people?

Sources continue to point this as an operation by either Israeli or Russian forces.  The theories seem to agree that the most likely illicit cargo the ship could be carrying was S300 anti-aircraft missiles being shipped to Iran.  I find that a bit unconvincing since Russia has been talking about selling those missiles openly to Iran for some time.

So, (engaging in wild, unsubstantiated speculation) I think it’s possible that either the ship was carrying S300s and the end user was someone other than Iran (perhaps Hamas?) or there was something other than S300s on the ship.

Now, not everyone agrees with this sort of hypothesis.  In fact, Ruslan Pukhov, rebuts this theory in what may be my favorite quote of the year.

“I think this is complete bullshit,” Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, said. He added: “I can explain why but I can’t be bothered.”

I really have to work that into my personal and professional life:  ‘I can explain why but I can’t be bothered.’

Pure gold!

“Conjecture without evidence of imminent harm…”

“…simply fails to meet the board’s burden of proof.”

That was part of a quote by a federal district judge rejecting the argument by the Federal Reserve that releasing the names of financial institutions which received assistance would cause harm and instability to the financial system.  (You can hear a little more on this Planet Money podcast)

I thought about this quote and how it could equally appeal to the over classification of information, particularly in law enforcement circles.  Don’t get me wrong, over classification is a big problem in the military (and I assume throughout the rest of the national security system) as well but that deserves it’s own treatment by someone more familiar with the subject than I.

Law enforcement, however, seems to fetishize the classification of information and do it for particularly poor reasons.  Now, there are some very good reasons for keeping some information generated by law enforcement and sub-national intelligence organizations (in which I’ll lump fusion centers and state or regional ‘homeland security’ agencies in addition to others).  Information about confidential informants and ongoing operations need to be kept secure lest investigations and the safety of people involved become compromised.  Likewise, some information about the understanding of the threat and vulnerabilities that can be exploited should be kept secret.

That does not mean, however, that the default position for all information generated or intended for consumption by these agencies needs to have a classification label attached to it.  Yet, far too often, information that is either publicly available or of an entirely trival nature is festooned with some many security caveats that you’d think that it contained the nuclear launch codes.

I think there are three basic reasons for this, two of which are never stated when defending the current practice but which, I believe, exert a considerable force in preventing any real reform to the system.

1. The criminals will know what we know. By far, this is most often cited as the reason by information has to be classified.  It assumes that criminals (and there is no distinction made about criminal groups with this argument, both the street level addict ripping off hubcaps for his next fix and the highly sophisticated international criminal network are viewed as equal here) are all conducting intense counter-intelligence operations with advanced collection plans and analysis of their own.  In short, agencies argue that criminals are doing a better job of intelligence work than they are.  The fact that such operations are exceedingly rare makes no matter.  The fact that anyone has done such work anywhere means that we need to act as if everyone is doing it everywhere.  This is where the judge’s quote comes into play.  Just because you can conceive of a possible threat doesn’t mean that threat is likely.  Life isn’t a Tom Clancy novel or an episode of ‘24′.
2. Look, ma!  I’m important.  Unfortunately, regional, state and local agencies have absorbed the lesson from the federal intelligence community that the only information that is worth looking at is information which is restricted in some way.  In many cases this whole thing is a bit of a game since caveats like ‘Law enforcement sensitive’ are useless in their lack of clear definition and sanctions if violated.  As a result, agencies put these restrictions on products no so much because of any harm which would result in the event of their unauthorized disclosure but as a badge designed to impart some authority on the product.  It’s not uncommon to see media reports, copies at length without additional commentary labeled law enforcement sensitive for no reason other than a lazy and pathetic attempt to generate an aura of authority and expertise.
3. Well, I actually forgot the third reason while writing this but I’m sure it was brilliant.  Until I can remember it and update this post, these first two reasons should be enough to support my argument.

The key in the above is that they are the victim (or, I guess, beneficiary) of unexamined assumptions.  And when there are questions about the validity of these arguments, where does everyone turn?  To the very people who propagate and operate under these systems.  Very frustrating.

We need to get away from fantastical scenarios of how criminals operate and begin to consider that, in fact, there are many benefits to making more information available to the general public.  We already release raw crime data to the public (in the form of UCR data).  Some states do a very good job of putting that data in formats that can searched in multiple ways and can be compared to other data sources.  Other states just publish a pdf document, which in todays information saturated world seems, to me at least, a lot like through a stack of papers at someone, giving them the middle finger salute and daring them to actually do anything with the data.

The public should not only know what sorts of criminal activities are occurring in their neighborhoods but they should also be able to get informative assessments of threats.  Why shouldn’t people be allowed to know if the authorities have determined a particular area is at low risk for terrorist attack but, let’s say, moderate risk for hate crimes, as well as how such a determination was made?  I fear the wrong lessons were learned earlier this summer when the DHS report on political extremism got leaked and created a PR firestorm.  Rather than caving into criticism, the DHS could have started a real dialog about their methodology and findings, using the incident to explain to the public how analysis works and what it is.  I’m sure there still would have been strong disagreements about the conclusions by many and even a bit of paranoid hysteria among the fringe but really, what a lost opportunity to educate the public.

State and local authorities have a lot to learn from this incident.  If they’re serious about conducting intelligence at all, they’d be much better off laying the groundwork and making the process as transparent as possible now, before they have to scramble to explain a potentially embarrassing conclusion or product.  The goal isn’t to get unanimous agreement with the conclusions but, as Prof. Roberto says, you need to achieve an understanding that the decision or analytical process is legitimate and fair.  Otherwise, you open yourself up to all sorts of criticism that you’re paving the way for a Socialist (or fascist, authoritarian, extraterrestrial, anti-christ, etc.) takeover of mom’s apple-pie business.

What’s the deal with the Artic Sea

Well, the global media machine has finally decided that I shouldn’t be the only person talking about the missing cargo ship the Artic Sea.  I’ll take this opportunity to pat myself on the back for finding this worthy of comment and you, loyal readers, may smugly admit that you’re wise decision to read this blog has meant that this has been on your radar screen for a full two weeks.

Reading the various reports about the incident, it’s clear that there are a lot of unexamined assumptions floating around put forward by parties with varied interests.  For example, if one assumes that the ship has been hijacked and that there are still some criminals on board, then there is little reason to assume that the report of being boarded or the ‘all clear’ when passing through the English Channel are reliable.

Also, it’s possible that the boarding of the ship in Swedish waters has nothing to do with the ship’s current disappearance and is rather just bad luck.

In an effort to make sense of the various theories and possiblities surrounding the Artic Sea, I decided to see if I could make a bit of sense out of the scarce information we have.  It’s by no means complete and it ain’t too pretty but I needed to strike while the iron was hot and before the NY Times scooped me on this.  So, here it is…potential players, motivations and hypotheses on the Artic Sea (click for a readable version):

Now, I must say that these possibilities are not necessarily probable but are possible and can’t be discounted out of hand.

Now, this format isn’t ideal and ultimately I’m trying to do too much with this graphic.  I’m not sure if there is a way to graphically capture everything I wanted to in one tool but the thought of doing this and an ACH was a bit exhausting (especially since I seem to be coming down with the creeping crud).

So, enjoy, and if you have any recommendations, questions or outraged complaints feel free to pass them along.

The Ghost Ship of the Baltic

Remember this post about the suspicious ‘hijacking’ of a Finnish ship off the coast of Sweden last month.

Just to catch up in case you missed it:

This is the version of the 15-man crew of the Arctic Sea of what happened then: The ship was in the area between Gotland and Öland at three in the morning on July 24th. Under cover of darkness, a rubber boat approached the ship, with the word Polis painted on the side. Between 8 and 10 hooded figures boarded the ship. They clubbed and tied up the night watchman and an engineer who had been on night shift. The hijackers, who claimed to be drug police, spoke English with an accent. They damaged the ship’s communications equipment, collected the mobile phones of the crew members, beat people, and searched for something.
After 12 hours, the hijackers left the ship, taking nothing with them. Their rubber boat curved away to the east.

Well, the ship has apparently disappeared now, with a (stated) cargo of almost $2 million dollars.

From Helsingin Sanomat:

“The fact that they did not go to port with their broken radios suggests that not everything was on the up-and-up”, says Kari Larjo, an experienced sea captain. “Nobody wants to sail without a radio.”

The story gets weirder:

Ships the size of the Arctic Sea are required to have Automatic Identification System (AIS) signaling equipment, which makes it possible to follow the course of a ship even on a home computer.

The last time that the Arctic Sea was located with the help of AIS was on July 29th, which means that the equipment was working at least five days after the alleged hijacking – contrary to what the shipping company suggested.

The ship should have arrived in Algeria on the 5th of August but hasn’t been seen or heard of since the end of July.  About a month before it set sail (on a three hour cruise?) it was in Russia undergoing repairs.

As an aside, if the Finnish reporting is accurate, the fact the the Piracy Reporting Center wasn’t even aware of this event as of the 9th of August doesn’t exactly fill me with confidence that they’re on the ball.

It seems unlikely that the lumber the Artic Sea was carrying was the intended target of the hijackers.  I laid out some potential hypotheses about their motives in the last post about this ship which I think are still in the running.  The BBC also has some speculation on the matter:

But Nick Davis, who runs the private security firm Anti-Piracy Maritime Security Solutions, told the BBC’s Today programme that the relatively low value of the cargo suggested this was a different kind of piracy to that seen off the coast of East Africa.

Instead, he suggested, it was more likely that the apparent seizure was the result of a “commercial dispute” in which one party had decided to “take matters into their own hands”.

My favorite theory:

A Russian journalist of Komsomolskaya Pravda speculated that it might have been Swedish revenge for the Battle of Pultava, where Russian Tsar Peter the Great humiliated the Swedish King Charles XII.

That was back in 1709 for those of you keeping score at home.

And now, Ivan is getting into the act:
Russian authorities have said they have been assessing the situation and five Navy vessels – including two nuclear submarines – have joined the search, according to Itar-Tass.

Crazy like a fox or just crazy?

Just a few days ago the Swedish press reported that:

“…secret information lists on the fight against organized crime have been leaked out to criminal sources.”

Whoops.  This is really weird since the police say that the information was stolen and no police are to be blamed.  Surely someone was responsible for the security of such information.

“The lists, known as the Alcatraz List and Nova List, contain a wide-range of information about Sweden’s toughest criminals, there associations to one another, as well a details about their relationships with family members, acquaintances, and girlfriends.”

I wrote about the new Swedish approach to organized crime recently.  While this event is probably not a good thing, allow me to put on my ‘glass is half full’ hat on and try to portray this as a brilliant move by Swedish law enforcement.

Consider that the Swedes were complaining that many on these lists had either not yet been prosecuted or faced significant jail time.  Maybe, just maybe, letting these lists leak is a way of putting pressure on these criminals.  If the criminals know what the police ‘know’ (or just release) might that force some to change their operations resulting in some sort of disruption?

And, even more sinister, it’s also reported that some people on these lists have been murdered.  It’s not clear if that is related to the release of the lists but I guess it’s possible that if some in Swedish law enforcement didn’t think they could sufficiently disrupt organized crime they could provide criminal groups with the intelligence they’d need to engage in a war between groups and hope they wipe each other out.  I think that this possibility is highly unlikely but hey, it’s all about alternate hypotheses.