I’ve been working through some journal articles that have been stacking up in my ‘to read’ bin.
Training and Educating U.S. Intelligence Analysts (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence vol22 no 1) Stephen Marrin.
Interesting (although not particularly ground breaking) discussion of the challenges the community is facing circa 2008. While the author confines his discussion to the federal IC, most of what he says applies to sub-national intelligence agencies as well.
He links a number of ideas that have been floated around for a few years. I like his description of intelligence training being divided into two general camps (‘trainers vs. educators’) which roughly corresponds to the debate of intelligence as art versus science, craft versus profession, etc. Ultimately settles on a none too surprising conclusion that a mix of both is what we need. The devil, as they say, remains in the details of actually bringing such a system to fruition.
The best part of the paper is an unanswered question that everyone in charge of an analytical unit or designer of an analytical training program should ask themselves before they undertake any reform.
Do the training centers teach structured methods because they are the best way to do analysis, or do they teach structured methods because that’s what they can teach?…are the intelligence organizations emphasizing the value of structured methods because their application produces better analysis, or because the formal process of teaching these methods provides a way for the organizations to prove to external overseers that they are improving…?
The Intelligence Analyst as Epistemologist (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence vol19 no 4) Mathew Herbert
Very interesting (if somewhat dense) article that argues that “[i]ntelligence analysis, unlike many mature professions, lacks an agreed, unified methodology and the experts necessary for regulating one.” That lack of shared paradigm allows all sorts of snake oil salesmen to sell (often times literally) their wares and drown out more rigorously done analysis.
What is required, Herbert asserts, is
- an emphasis on difference between what is known and what is believed
- an ability to understand and communicate the level of probability or uncertainty in both individual assumptions as well as how uncertainties within a chain of reasoning interact with each other
- an understanding of key information which is unknown but could alter a particular analytical judgment (those pesky Rumsfeldian ‘known unknowns’)
Definitely worth a second read.
Political Scrutiny and Control of Scandinavia’s Security and Intelligence Services (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence vol13 no 2) Geoffrey R. Weller
An overview of domestic intelligence scandals in Sweden, Norway and Denmark from post WWII to the mid-90s and the differing responses from the various governments. It’s particularly interesting to read this article (written in 2000) from a post 9/11 viewpoint where intelligence services were given much wider latitude in their activities among domestic populations.
If you aren’t particularly interested in the region, here’s the relevant bit for wherever you are:
The Scandinavian experience of controversy in relation to the security and iintelligence serves indicates clearly that control that blends protection for citizens and a need for efficient iintelligence agencies is extremely difficult to achieve, even in nations with a strong democratic tradition and a strong tradition of parliamentary supremacy.
Or, may I add, with a popular leader promising change and a more open, transparent government. (H/T A. Sullivan)
Harsh Lessons: Roman Intelligence in the Hannibalic War (International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence vol17 no 3) Daniel A. Fournie Caesar, Intelligence, and Ancient Britain ((International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence vol15 no 1) Rose Mary SheldonI mention these together not only because they cover similar subject matter (intelligence in ancient Rome) but because the Fournie piece was heavily influenced by the work of Sheldon.
If you have an interest in ancient Rome or military history I’d recommend both of these pieces. They do an admirable job of taking sparse source material to talk about ideas and concepts which weren’t developed at the time. Even though I was familiar with both military conflicts I have to admit I never thought of them from an intelligence perspective. Good stuff.




