Gangs and insurgencies – the final chapter

I figured I had said all there was to about this subject and then David Kilcullen had to go and appear on The Colbert Report.  Check it out (sorry, I can’t seem to embed it).

Here’s the relevant exchange (forgive any errors in the transcription but this is really close if not exact):

Colbert:  …[You say] people in poor communities turn to gangs for protection, for services when the government can’t do it for them…

Kilcullen:  Exactly right…There’s actually a huge amount of similarity between basic police work and the sort of stuff that happens with gangs and so on and what happens in this [insurgency] environment.

So, first, it’s nice to know that David obviously reads this blog but he really should credit me for these ideas [I'm just kidding Mr. Kilcullen.  Call me! ]

More seriously, I’d make a slight tweak to his observation.  There is a huge similarity to the challenges in police work and insurgencies but I’d argue that most American police departments have been trying to approach those problems from a mindset that more closely hews to traditional military thinking that counterinsurgency doctrine.

Current anti-crime measures are almost exclusively reactive and suppression based.  You wait for a crime to occur, you find the suspect and you arrest him/her.  There’s no identification or addressing of underlying factors.

This video really struck a cord with me since I had virtually the same conversation with my command which I was in Afghanistan in 2003.  My command could not get their heads around the idea of insurgency and could only conceive of conventional military threats.  Hence, I was tasked to do an Intelligence Preperation of the Battlefield so that they could plan what to do if the Taliban attempted to overrun Bagram airfield.  Now, Bagram had over 10,000 soldiers at the time, in addition to a sizable number of attack helicopters and aircraft and yet, the only threat scenario these guys could come up with was a Taliban motorized rifle division coming over the Koh-i-Safi mountains.  IEDs?  Rocket attacks?  Nah…”This isn’t Iraq” I was told or “C’mon…who does that?”

As a side note, my repeated attempts to convince them that such a scenario was highly unlikely and that other threats should have a higher priority went unheeded, setting off an unfortunate string of increasingly dysfunctional exchanges which ended with me telling the S-3 that he was full of bulls*it at a very full shift change brief.  (Not a particularly wise move for a mid-level NCO although, miraculously, I avoided any repercussions).

We had a number of soldiers with civilian law enforcement experience and I recommended dragooning them, on a part time basis, to assist in intelligence gathering and developing a decent view of our new operating environment.  Command couldn’t figure out why we couldn’t get all the information we needed from the internet.  Needless to say, that didn’t happen and 2003-2004 in Afghanistan (at least in the Bagram area) can best be thought of as a year of lethargy.

Still, it is encouraging to hear that the military was inspired in part by the academic/research work done in law enforcement and people who understood the issue made it to the top.   Hopefully the military can return the favor to the law enforcement community.

Gangs and Insurgencies (Con’t)

Last week I wrote a piece about an article trying to describe criminal street gangs as insurgencies and a serious threat to nation states.  It did generate a couple of comments that highlighted my tendency to offer superficial answers and I think it’s worthwhile to flesh out my ideas a bit.

Peter said:

Where I part company with Dean is the idea that urban counter-gang strategy should be modelled on counterinsurgency doctrine. In Dean’s words, “Restore order, establish you’re there for the long haul and rebuild infrastructure, opportunity and trust”.

In theory this sounds like a good plan. But in practice, how many American municipal authorities have the resources to do this justice? And how would they sustain progress for the long haul? Success ultimately depends on people having secure jobs in legit economies. That in turn relies on industry returning to inner cities. There are good reasons why industry left – like changing patterns of demand, new means of production, the lure of cheap offshore labour – and that will be impossible to reverse.

There are some problems with me advocating counterinsurgency principles when discussing dealing with domestic criminal networks.  I’m not talking about calling in troops, imposing martial law or anything like that.  Rather, it’s an understanding that there are underlying factors which are driving the negative behavior (whether financially or politically motivated) and until you address those factors, you aren’t going to get any long term success.

So, we’ve seen policy groping towards this idea through Broken Windows theory or the implementation of the Boston Gun Project or its new incarnation. These programs attempt to go beyond the standard ‘Book ‘em Dano’ approach and aren’t unrealistic in terms of resource requirements.  They do however face some serious problems:

• While, at their best, they incorporate and encourage social service/community involvement, law enforcement by its nature (with access to reliable funding, it’s highly structured organization and the ‘long tail’ of the criminal justice system behind it) is gong to be the (very) senior partner in any such program and effectively calling all the shots.
• Government decision makers are similar to business decision makers in that they have short term horizons.  Instead of looking at the next quarter or fiscal year they are primarily concerned with the next election cycle.  Therefore, reducing crime now is usually more favored than enacting policies which might lead to reduced crime later.  That means money and resources will flow to those things (like cops on the streets, new prisons, tougher criminal penalties) which encourage short term suppression rather than those (better job opportunities, social services, education) that lead to long term crime reduction.
• There are few to no potential partners for any of these schemes which can address long term concerns.  In COIN language of ‘Clear, Hold, Build’, we’ve got the ‘clear’ capability, might have the ‘hold’ capability and aren’t even trying to address the ‘build’ portion.

Admittedly, local and state governments (most of which are strapped for cash) would need to make some tough decisions if they wanted to address these problems over the long term.

Right now, anti-crime/gang initiative usually originate in the same way:

1. Ignore problem
2. Some ‘newsworthy’ event occurs (usually a child killed in a crossfire between warring groups)
3. Public outrage ensues
4. Officials spring into action and flood the area with police resources, arresting anyone and everyone they can
5. Criminals lay low
6. Crime falls
7. Law enforcement is quietly withdrawn
8. Return to #1 above

This is not a recipe for long term success and I reject the idea that we have to tell (implicitly or explicitly) that this is the best they can hope for.  Local/State/Federal governments will have to make some choices and I’m by no means an expert who can recommend what should be cut to pay for this but accepting the status quo seemsincredibly short sighted.

The first priority must be to restore order and not with the ‘drive by policing’ system we have now.  In many communities the public safety sector is viewed as indifferent (at best) to hostile (at worst) and trust can be non-existent.

Law enforcement and emergency services therefore should be permanently stationed (and adequately staffed) in the worst areas and not just drive through on patrol.  This will be difficult for some municipalities which find themselves running from one emergency call to another but where county or state law enforcement resources can come into play.  Right now, those resources are often disbursed on a myriad of investigative missions, diluting their effectiveness.  Instead, those forces should be used as a strategic reserve (think of county/state law enforcement as a potential comitatenses to the local police’s limitanei).  This is where the Broken Window/Operation CeaseFire plans can be implemented.  Restore order and trust.  Commit to a long term presence.

While I’m not an urban policy guy I suspect there are a host of ideas and initiatives that could be tried to restore legitimate opportunities for employment in even the most depressed communities.  People in these areas get by now through the gray or black markets.  Microfinancing for small, legitimate service jobs (auto repair, tailoring, babysitting, etc.).  Tax subsidies for outside business/industry.  Converting/leasing open space for food production.  Don’t worry about competing in the world economy but initially focus on serving the local community (which is what the illicit market has done so well by providing narcotics, prostitution, gambling, etc).

Gangs and insurgencies

Foreign Policy has an interesting looking article about the organized crime and insurgencies.  In it, the author cites a new paper in the Small Wars Journal by John P. Sullivan titled “Future Conflict: Criminal Insurgencies, Gangs and Intelligence”.  I don’t know how but Sullivan somehow manages to sucker me into reading his stuff every time and every time I’m disappointed.  The paper is a motherload of unexamined assumptions, outdated information and self promotion (17 of his 24 footnotes cite himself).  I don’t know Sullivan and I’m sure he’s a great guy but if this is the sort of thinking that’s driving policy as Robbert Haddick is kinda-sorta implying, we’re in big trouble.  Sullivan has been promoting essentially the same idea for over 10 years, that gangs are going to politicize and become the major threat to the nation state system as these modern day barbarians storm the gates and plunge us into a new dark age.

Oh…he also seems to have a bizarre obsession with the number 3.  There are three ‘generations of gangs’ and three types of cartels.  Why three?  Beats me, since the categories are entirely arbitrary and there’s no evidence to support these divisions.

He begins with a bold statement:

“Gangs dominate the intersection between crime and war.”

I don’t even know what the hell that means but he tells us he’s going to examine areas where “acute and endemic crime and gang violence challenge the solvency of state political control.”  Therein lies his major defect, as I see it.  For Sullivan, gangs are a cause of instability rather than a function of it.  Therefore…eliminate the gang and stability returns.

Too bad there’s no evidence for that.

Gangs don’t form to ‘challenge the rule of law’ as Sullivan states, but rather, form to fill a void where the rule of law is absent.  In the absence of order, people organize and when a group of people are in a Hobbsian state of nature (whether in a Brazilian slum or an urban housing project here in the U.S.) the people who can wield force tend to run things.  They may get more ambitious later but I think you’ll find very few people entering the life of crime with the goal of undermining the Westphalian system (check out Gang Leader for a Day if you want a brilliant 320 page example of this).  They want to meet their basic Maslow(ian?) needs initially.

Transnational gangs aren’t the reason there isn’t a strong, stable democracy in Russia, Columbia, Nigeria or Mexico.  Those nations have a history of corruption, instability and lack of public safety that precedes the arrival/creation of transnational gangs in their territories.  Gangs certainly don’t make the situation better but I’d like to see the evidence that they are the cause of these problems.

He then describes ‘criminal enclaves’ and uses Ciudad del Este as an example.  He discribes it thus:

A jungle hub for the world’s outlaws, a global village of outlaws, the triple border zone serves as a free enclave for significant criminal activity, including people who are dedicated to supporting and sustaining acts of terrorism. Denizens of the enclave include Lebanese gangsters and terrorists, drug smugglers, Nigerian gangsters and Asian mafias: Japanese Yakuza, Tai Chen (Cantonese mafia), Fuk Ching, the Big Circle Boys, and the Flying Dragons. This polyglot mix of thugs demonstrates the potential of criminal netwarriors to exploit the globalization of organized crime.

That certainly seems to make sense but if there’s such a good case that the area is as bad as all that why does he use a reference that’s ten years old?  Are we to assume that this area of the world has been untouched by 9/11 and its aftermath?  There’s certainly been work done to assess the nature of Ciudad del Este in the past ten years why not mention any of it?

Ciudad del Este is a cartel?  Who’s running it?  Is there some sort of Evil League of Evil pulling the strings or is it an anarchic wonderland that attracts all sorts of criminal and terrorist group because they can all do their own thing?  If the latter, how could it be a cartel?

There’s just so much to critique in the paper I’m not sure how much detail I should go into.  His ‘generations of gangs’ is absolutly terrible and has no utility when discussing gangs or anti-gang strategy.  It’s uselessness is demonstrated by his definitions of the generations which require the existance of gangs which exist in more than one generation at a time.  So, does that mean there are five generations?  Four and a half?  It starts to feel like the papal astronomers adding more and more orbits to the planets in order to keep the Earth at the center of the universe.  Just dump it and find a better explanitory tool already.

I’ve been looking at gangs for about 10 years now and ever since that time I’ve been hearing horror stories about how gangs are just about ready to destroy civilization.  I suspect scaremongering like this has a lot more to do with securing grant funding and speaking engagements than it does with depicting reality.  Some gang leaders in the U.S. do occasionally attempt to transform their gang into a politically motivated force.  There are even some examples of short term, local successes on their part.  But they don’t last over time or space because of a number of inherent contradictions between the conditions needed for a politically motivated group (even if criminal) and an economically motivated one.

There are some interesting parallels between gangs and insurgencies.  They both feed on disenfranchisement.  The Sunnis fueled the insurgency in Iraq because they were out of power and looking to be on the wrong end of a payback spree.  The reason street gangs went from neighborhood nuicence to serious criminal problem has a lot to do with collapsing economic systems in inner cities in the 70s and 80s, the rise of narcotics as an opportunity to achieve financial well being and neglect by government of social services.  Both populations had little to lose and so elements of that population decided ‘What the hell’.

There are important lessons to our response to both as well.  Our current anti-gang strategy (such as it is) much more resembles our Iraq strategy (such as it was) in 2003-2006.  We generally isolate ourselves from the population, do the occassional ‘kenetic operation’, engage in the usual post operational chest pounding and declarations that we’ve ‘turned a corner’ and then find ourselves right back where we’ve started.

Perhaps the answer isn’t what Sullivan recommends (more riot police, counterterrorism forces, high intensity policing, etc. – you know an M-16 armed balaclava wearing dude on every streetcorner to kick the shit out of anyone who questions state authority) but rather the same principles advocated for COIN operations.  Hearts and minds.  Clear, Hold, Build.  Restore order, establish you’re there for the long haul and rebuild infrastructure, opportunity and trust.  Yes, it’ll be expensive.  Yes, it’ll take a lot of time.  Clearly building and filling prisons isn’t proving to be the answer so perhaps it’s time for a different approach.

Attention Gang Researchers!

Effective today, all of the underlying data for the New Jersey Street Gang Surveys conducted in 2001, 2004 and 2007 are available to the public.

You can access the data here.

Enjoy!

The gang and the community

I just finished listening to the audio version of ‘Gang Leader for a Day‘ by Sudhir Venkatesh.  The book has so much to recommend it, it’s hard to know where to start.  To begin with the reader is simply brilliant, giving voice to the wide range of characters and delivering the intensity of the content.  My only quibble is the lame bass beat that begins and ends each section of the book.  It tends to play over the first seconds of the reader and is a bit annoying but overall isn’t a deal-breaker.

The content of the book is the real winner however.  Venkatesh spend six years conducting research in the Robert Taylor projects of Chicago during the early 1990s.  During his time there, he became intimately acquainted with the underground economy with the guide of a local gang leader.

For anyone interested in the issue of street gangs this book really should be required reading.  Too often, street gangs are portrayed as one dimensional characters who do little other than sell drugs and conduct drive by shootings.  Venkatesh describes how the gang both preyed and protected the local population.  Local authorities esentially abondoned the residents of Robert Taylor to their own devices and the gang stepped in to provide some sort of order.

The gang then, perhaps intentionally, got the local population to accept their leadership as legitimate which is, I think, one of the key points about gangs that often is overlooked by law enfocement.  Usually, when law enforcement completes a gang investigation it ends with the arrest of some of it’s members and considers it a success if the gang’s ability to conduct it’s criminal activity is disrupted.  In situations like those described by Venkatesh, however, it’s easy to see how such an investigation could lead to a population more at risk then before.  After all, the law enforcement resources that were dedicated to the investigation get pulled out to put out the next fire.  The residents are left with the same dearth of services and the inattention of local government and, in addition, are seen as vulnerable territory by rival gangs.

That’s one of the big reasons why big arrests of criminal networks tend not to solve crime problems.  If we could eliminate the Coca-Cola company today would millions of people stop drinking soda or would Pepsi and others just move in and absorb their market share?  How about if we did nothing further to hinder the drinking of soft drinks?  That’s essentially what we do with many of our gang investigations today (although they’re rarely lucky enough to take out the biggest company in the field…usually it’s just the local Nehi distributor)

The story is loaded with more ideas that deserve to be explored.  How gang members see themselves, the community in which they live/work and the world at large.  How various groups of the residents self organize in order to provide protection and resources.  How the authorities (both corrupt and non-corrupt) interact with the projects.

In fact, I’m going to have to buy the hard copy in order to reread it.

Distopian Linkfest

Just when you begin to think that South Africa really is a civilized nation they seem to go out of their way to convince you that’s not, in fact the case.

Is an Afghan version of the Tet Offensive in the works?  CNN seems to be implying it may be.  Excuse me for stating the obvious but that would be very, very bad.  Of course, if you are the Taliban leadership this is probably a good time to try a bold move.  Spring has arrived, the 17,000 troops haven’t (yet), Washington still hasn’t completed their strategic review, nobody is quite sure what the Europeans are going to do, a new narrative which is decidedly gloomy about our prospects there and national policy makers are distracted with the economic crisis.  A significant strike which makes the Afghan/coalition forces look weak or over-reactive might convince enough people that the whole thing isn’t worth it and encourage us to get the hell out.

Via Kotare, (who linked here which makes this the stereotypical snake eating its own tail) Jeff Vail predicts the imminent dissolution of the Mexican state.  I can’t comment on his hypothesis that this is signaling the beginning of the end of the nation state (although I’m putting his paper on my reading list since my weak laptop won’t allow me to do what I’d prefer to spend my time on) but I think something has been missed in all this talk about the problems going on south of the border.

The civil wars in Central America during the 1980s resulted in an  strange cyclical flow of criminals and insurgents between the U.S. and countries south of our borders.  As times got tough or conflicts ended, a number of people came north with few skills other than serving in the military or being an insurgent.  Unable to merge into the legitimate economy, they found their skills could be put to use in criminal activities and contributed to the rise in the Hispanic gang population.  Then…

Since the mid-1990s, U.S. immigration policy has dramatically boosted the proliferation of gangs throughout Latin America and Asia by deporting tens of thousands of immigrants with criminal records back to their home countries each year, including a growing number of gang members. In 1996, around 38,000 immigrants were deported after committing a crime; by 2003, the number had jumped to almost 80,000. Often, gang members have spent nearly their entire lives in the United States. But once they run afoul of the law, their immigrant status leaves them vulnerable to deportation.

The countries that receive the flood of deportees are usually ill-equipped to deal with so many returning gang members.

It’s not as though many gang members wish to remain in the countries of their birth. With little or no connection to their new homes, deported gang members typically face a simple choice: either find a way to return to the United States or seek protection from local gang members. In the case of MS-13, the U.S. government has deported hundreds of members, many of whom continue to illegally migrate back and forth, often carrying goods or people with them. Those that remain in their home countries are almost sure to connect with other deported gang members, and authorities in these countries say they are responsible for a large upswing in crime and violence. In a sense, U.S. immigration policy has amounted to unintentional state-sponsored gang migration. Rather than solving the gang problem, the United States may have only spread it.

(Check out the whole source article here)

So, even if Mexico doesn’t collapse will we see a repeat (perhaps on a larger scale) of this behavior?  A further spread of Mexican gangs fueled by the criminal groups seeking to establish/consolidate their position in the illicit commodities trade and also by the revolving door of criminals being deported to Mexico and sneaking back into the U.S., usually to stay with friends/family in a sort of unintentional colonization.

[W]hen people move, they take their culture with them. For example, Trey, a member of Chicago’s massive Gangster Disciples, moved to a small town in Arkansas where his brother, who is not a gang member, had found a job. Although Trey tried to “go legit,” he soon found that his status as a Gangster Disciple from the housing projects of Chicago gave him a formidable reputation in small-town Arkansas. Within nine months, he started a new Gangster Disciples “chapter” with 15 members.

And to top it all off, Germany is now selling ‘Obama-fingers‘.  I’m not sure if something has been lost in translation or German marketers have decided to target the cannibal/zombie demographic directly.  Either way, nothing good can come of this.

Yep…time to get your ‘Go bags’ ready ladies and gentlemen.  I think I’ll re-watch Mad Max this weekend (this time as an instructional video).

New Jersey Gang data is now available!

I am very, very happy to announce that Princeton University is planning on posting up, for anyone to use, the underlying data behind the New Jersey State Police gang survey reports from 2001, 2004 and 2007.

Now this is pretty big news if you’re interested in this sort of thing because, as far as I know, the underlying data behind most (if not all) of these gang surveys has not been released to the general public before.  Now, for the first time, people can look at the individual responses of the data and compare the responses over the years or subject the data to whatever sort of statistical analysis they want.

I should also mention that the 2001 survey never resulted in a public report and the findings of that survey was only discussed in relation to the 2004 findings.

Currently, only the 2001 data is posted but the rest should be up at some point in the (hopefully not too distant) future.  It may be found here even though it is incorrectly labeled “National Youth Gang Survey” it is, in fact, the 2001 New Jersey State Police Street Gang Survey data.  Hopefully the label will be changed in the near future as well.

The site it is hosted on is quite interesting as well, allowing “resources and assistance in finding, using, and analyzing social science data”.  It’s been awhile (too long) since I took statistics in school but you can do some nice things with the data using their statistical software.

A bit of information about the data:  The 2001 survey looked at approximately 100 cities within New Jersey.  2004 expanded to over 400 municipalities and the 2007 survey got responses regarding all but one (with Elizabeth winning the ‘Team Player No Prize’)

So, I’m hoping this data will prompt researchers, students and the general public to use this data, analyze it or mash it up with other data sets and come up with different ways of looking at it.  If you happen to be one of those intrepid individuals (or know someone who is), please let me know what you find!

More Gang Panic!

USAToday reported that a new (unpublished) report by the National Gang Intelligence Center is claiming that there are 1 million gang members in the U.S. and that they are “responsible for up to 80% of crimes in communities across the nation…”.

Wow…time to buy some guns and move, right?

Well, not so fast.  I haven’t seen the report but I have seen a number of official and semi-official gang reports in my day and they share similar characteristics.  They may not be present in the NGIC report but I’d be surprised if they weren’t.

1. They are frequently based upon survey data.  Usually (almost always) non-scientific.  Poor question wording, poor administration.
2. In practice, such surveys are frequently handed off to designated ‘gang unit’ personnel.  These personnel usually have both personal and professional interests in overestimating the number of gang members within their jurisdiction and their criminal activity.
   1. Now, there are some instances where officials will underestimate the impact of gangs in their jurisdiction.  That appears (to me) to have been much more common 5-10 years ago then today.  A better tactic is either to just answer about what your neighboring jurisdictions (don’t make waves) do or not answer the survey at all (don’t say anything that lead to controversy and there won’t be any story)
3. Gang population numbers and estimates of increase/decrease in the total population are essentially picked out of a hat.
4. Implicit assumptions are made (and reported) that gangs are hierarchical, disciplined organizations that resemble efficient corporations.  There is very little evidence that any more than a small minority of gangs resemble that picture.
5. Gang, gang member and gang crime are very poorly defined within the law enforcement community.  In many jurisdictions and crime committed by a gang member is automatically categorized as a ‘gang crime’.  This greatly skews the numbers upwards and contributes to the false notion that gangs are powerful organizations unleashing a wave of planned criminality on our streets.  If someone steals an iPod because he wants an iPod and he happens to be a gang member is that a gang crime or ‘just’ the actions of a thief?
6. Many jurisdictions have methods (formal or informal) for identifying gang members.  Few have methods for verifying their membership or removing them from whatever ‘database’ they maintain.  Gang databases are a bit like a roach motel…easy to get into, very hard to get out of (even if you’re not a roach).

So..if these reports don’t do a good job of accurately portraying the threat, why do them?

Money.

In tough economic times, when there’s going to be a lot of pressure to reduce government spending and the terrorist threat is no longer #1 on the list of people’s concerns, a headline like “Burgeoning gangs behind up to 80% of U.S. crime“ is great to have in your back pocket when it’s appropriations time.

Now, to be fair, it’s not all about money.  I do know a number of very good intentioned people who really do believe the sky is falling and we’re a (hip)hop, skip and a jump away from being overrun by gangs and turning into a post-apocalyptic, Mad-Max style world.  These people generally (and I’m only exaggerating slightly) assume everyone between the ages of 12 and 24 who has a stitch of red clothing on is a murderous Blood member.

So, is this gang thing all hype, or what?

Well, gangs clearly do pose a threat and are involved in all sorts of criminal activity and there has been some research that indicates gang membership is correlated in increased criminality when compared to non-gang peer groups.

Still, they’re clearly not the existential threat to society they’re often made out to be.   The real problem is that we have no way of determining what the threat is on much more than a local level.  This is where the intelligence ball is really getting dropped.  Most law enforcement agencies view intelligence work which isn’t directly related to an ongoing investigation that will result in arrests as academic hooey and a waste of time.  Policy is frequently driven by anecdotal evidence, highly misleading or distorted media reports, and/or political expediency.

Hey, have a nice day!

Guest Post – Sweet Talkin’ The Gangstas Off their Perch

This is a momentous occasion here at Travels with Shiloh corporate headquarters.  For the first time in our two year history, we welcome a guest blogger, signaling that I’m that much closer to hitting the big time.  Can a lucrative sponsorship deal, product tie ins, an increasingly erratic and dangerous lifestyle filled with booze, drugs and hookers, followed by the inevitable crash and eventual redemption be far behind?  Move over Arianna…Suck it Tina Brown.

‘Robespierre’ is an expert in the subject of criminal activity in the Land of Milk and Honey and hopefully we’ll continue to get his unique perspective on the unusual goings on there. Take it away, Robespierre…

At last! The most effective crime deterrent in the United States isn’t boots-on-the-ground or cops-on-the-beat.  It’s Mrs. Butterworth.

This report  in the January 13 edition of a local newspaper described the lengths to which harried urban residents will go in order to rid their property of unwanted visitors:

“Residents [in the Lafayette area of Jersey City] complained to police of people hanging out on corners and intimidating residents, prompting one local to pour pancake syrup on her stoop to keep loiterers away.
‘I know it’s stupid, but it works,’ said Raquel Sharper, vice president of the Communipaw Avenue Block Association. ‘There’s sometimes 30 people out there,’ she said.”

Although Jersey City’s police chief has promised swift response to citizen complaints, the standard law enforcement tactics of fugitive roundups, stop-and-frisk operations, and street corner drug busts may fall short of the mark.  Drastic times call for drastic measures, and there’s no better time than NOW to deploy society’s secret weapon:  a police auxiliary citizens brigade that performs community policing the old-fashioned way.  Federal economic stimulus funds can provide these civic-minded volunteers with a modest stipend, and federal Byrne grant funds can pay for their uniforms and equipment.

However, Mrs. Butterworth alone may not be able to rid our cities of the gang scourge.  That’s why I recommend immediate activation of the ultimate anti-gang “surge force” — the iconic power-woman of the breakfast kitchen, someone whose culinary specialty is inextricably associated with syrup in American culture, someone whose mighty rolling pin enforces discipline throughout the household and throughout the neighborhood, someone so potent her name dare not be uttered aloud.  You know who I mean. . . . and so does PepsiCo.

[ed note: As long as it has the word 'surge' in it, federal funds can be expected to gravitate to it like matter around a black hole.]

Swedish Gangsters

The Local had two articles recently surrounding the activities of a very interesting criminal organization.

The first, describes how the ‘Original Gangsters’ have taken over the operation of a website designed to identify and expose sex offenders.  It seems the previous administrators got nervous from threats to their safety (I assume from those named on the site) and decided to hand off administration of the site to a group they thought would be immune from such pressure.

“We have families to think about and the threats have recently been getting a little close to home. Call us weak if you will but the family always comes first,” explained the four founders in a statement on the site.

OG leader Denho “Dano” Acar explained that the the gang “wanted to provide a community service” and underlined that taking over the site “has nothing to do with money.”

Now, while authorities are concerned because this might lead to vigilante justice, it seems to me that this could be another criminal enterprise for the group.  It seems like a near perfect extortion racket.  Since they control the site, one assumes that they decide who is placed on it and who isn’t.  They can then charge offenders (perhaps explained as a ‘fine’ to help the victims) to keep or take their name off the list.  Of course, there’s no reason to stop there.  Since this is a private web site, there’s no reason why the group couldn’t threaten to ‘identify’ other people if they don’t pay a fee.

So, what happens if someone doesn’t pay and gets listed?  Well, maybe nothing.  But…

“Many of the comments on Kriminellt’s user forum are of a threatening nature with specific warnings directed towards some of the convicted rapists, child sex offenders and child pornography offenders listed on the website.“

So, the Original Gangsters can send their goons over to punish the guilty can claim ignorance to the actual attack by saying that some concerned citizens must have taken the law into their own hands.  Assuming, of course, they can’t actually goad some non-members to do the beatings.

Now, beyond this, the story is fascinating for a couple of reasons.

• they actually interview the gang leader, something that just isn’t done here
• Mr. Acar clearly identifies himself and his organization as criminal.  Again, not something you see here.
• Mr. Acar isn’t supposed to be in Sweden.  He may be operating in Turkey but the Swedish press seem to have no problem interviewing him and so, perhaps the court order to get out of the country may have been more of a polite request (never underestimate the Swedish judicial system’s reluctance to enforce its decisions)

The second story, which may be related to the first, describes a hacker attack upon Acar’s email account publicly posting his emails.  I won’t dwell on the fact that the photos on their website make them look an awful lot like they’re trying our for a slot with the Village People.

If the Wikipedia entry is to be believed the gang charges dues of about $150 a month which certainly would keep out the riff-raff.  Many street gangs here in the U.S. have trouble collecting anything from it’s members.

It’s not at all clear if the U.S. doesn’t have gangs like this or if they just don’t show up on law enforcement radar.  There’s been some interesting research that has argued that race and socio-economic status has more to do with a criminal network getting the ‘gang’ label than any particular activity.  Therefore, gangs made up of multiethnic people of middle class backgrounds tend to get labeled as ‘troublemakers’ rather than criminal thugs.